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INTRODUCTION 
Tasmania•s role in constitutional referenda, lik'= many other 
aspects of her political processes has been subjected at the most to 
a cursory glance, but more often continual neglect. The first purpose 
of this study then is to attempt, albeit ·in a small way, to remedy this 
situation and desct•ibe the conduct of a referendum in Tasmania. 
Studies of this nature, despite their limited scope, do 
contribute to the literature on referenda in Australia. Constitutional 
referenda have been examined almost since Federation but many of these 
studies have been superficial and to date no satisfactory body of theory 
exists. Generalisations about referenda can therefore be ma:le only 
through an analysis of the life story of each. To date no other study 
has concentrated specifically upon the four referenda he 1 d on the 21st 
May, 1977, nor have any studies analysed any previous referendum in 
Tasmania. In fact many authors dismiss out of hand Tasmania's role in 
a r·eferendum and consider her propensity to deliver a negative vote as 
determined by fear and conservatism. 
The 1977 referenda have been chosen for study for a number of 
reasons, not least of which is that they are the most recent and much 
primary informat·ion is still available. In addition the memories of 
the principal political protagonists have not yet been blurred by the 
passage of t·ime. Further Tasmania•s vote was in keeping vlith her 
traditional response: to vote ;Yes; when proposals have the overVJhelm-
ing support of the whole nation and are seen as just and valid reforms 
to the Constitution, and on all other occasions, (except when they 
clearly favour the State), to vote 'No'. 
1. 
2. 
Any study of a referendum necessarily re-examines in the light 
of its experience the nature of the referendum and in doing so verifies 
or queries most of the famil1ar hypotheses. The hypoth2sis that, when 
referenda are not controversial :md are suppOl~ted by all major political 
parties they are usually accepted by the people, is well illustrated by 
the success of the Senate Casual Vacancies, Referendums and Retiring 
Age for Feder-al Judges referenda in 1977. Contrary to many hypotheses 
however, the Simultaneous Elections referendum showed that even the 
support of both political parties ·is no guarantee of success when the 
issues involved become highly contentious. On these occasions State 
par·ties have a tendency to disagree with their Federal counterparts 
and, because of a combination of this and other factors, their opinions 
are more 1 ike ly to be accepted by the people of their State. This 
situation occurred in Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania in 1977 
and so ensured the defeat of the Simultaneous Elections proposal. 
It is also interesting to examine in this context the hypotheses 
of Wildavsky.L From a study of the controversy which developed surround-
ing the 1926 Commerce and Industry pr·oposal he developed a number of 
theories concerning referenda. He maintained that in the party sponsor-
i ng a refer'endum the propos a 1 i nvari ably exacerbates stresses and strains 
and these spread out and cross both federa 1 and State 1 ines. These 
div·isions are of long standing and exist prior to the referendum. They 
are crystallised by it and the spactacular confl·icts that develop on 
the political level are only an extension of the;;e internal tensions. 
l·~ildavsky's second thesis is that the very nature of a referendum 
involves a change in the balance of power and this alone fosters conflict 
1. A. 
s 
, 
11 Thc! 1926 Referendum11 , in A. \·J"i ldavsky and A. Carboch, 
tra·l·ian Poli ·ics Cheshin:~, r~elbourne, 1958. 
3. 
as some groups must gain while others lose. Hence parties find it diffi-
cult to adopt a united approach across all fronts and the inter and intra 
group conflict leads in the final analysis to unu5ual alliances on both 
sides. The referendum also shows up the federal nature of parties and 
the pl~ecal"i ousness of their federa 1-State re 1 ati onshi p. 
The reasons behind the 1977 referenda remain somewhat of a 
mystery. The immediate effect of the Simultaneous Elections Bill was 
that the half Senate Election due before the 30th t~ay 1978 caul d be 
postponed by six months or so into early 1979 and, as a result, the 
Prime Minister could have more time to bring the economy back into shape 
before having to face an election. Hm-Jever, though it was acknowledged 
that this vJas the Government's prime motive for the referenda that it 
should think it necessary remains inexplicable. 
The L-NCP was returned in 1975 vlith the largest .. ever recorded 
majority in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. Even if a 
half Senate election were held and went against the Government, it 
would still have retained control unless there v1as a momentous swing: 
by all accounts unlikely. The only possible threat, though by no means 
impending danger-, lay in the question of Senate Casual vacancies where 
in three ~:t~tes Labor Governments were in power. As Agsint this the 
~ /'r (~\ .,.""-~.r..'~>>!frAVJ.'<».~w 
a~~~~,, · Simultaneous Elections proposal ~<as unnecessary 
J\;Jl)~~)~? to ensure contemporaneous e 1 ecti ons and had already 
!, .. _.· '! .~j ~;·;) \?1,\IT tc;f:Tlr{:;-·,:·'7 been defeated by the people thl~ee years 
r~:~. )·-~ ~:.~1.-.,vn,.;~:J;j previously. On that occasion and again in \' _;::::./::\)!. /f l 1975 the L-·NC:P hnd stronalv oooosed the Bill. 
Q! )1·:·-:: .f[~.:.;'_·~~:x~ ··~;~~~:); Yet, such -wa~tr1~·-p ~.;me ~i ~is~~ r 1 s be 1 i e f ~/;. . .'~~·,·\) "·"'"" .,I:{;-~· .. :;.·-~· ~.~ ~ l'<'t\' /(,)_ ! (•, th t th f' d . t. th t h -C)/:~·0~_;;(•· 1~,,,.,..-? a· e re ·e ren a was 1 mpera 1 ve a e was 
8our>ce: 'l: .. 'f:!:f~--~~u;; !75!:1fm~ 2 Saturday, 26 Pebru(J).?y_, 197?. -· 
2. The cartoons in the text shov1 some of the comment that the referenda 
aroused. 
prepared to face consi derab "le cyni ci srn and ace us ati ons of hypocrisy 
from both within the Liberal Party and the community at lar£e and, if 
defeated, the 1 oss of credi b·i 1 ity and sup port and exposure to the 
retribution of the States. 
4. 
The only r~eal reason presented by the Government in support of 
their presentation was that the proposals had been the subject of 
recommendations at the Hobart Constitution a 1 Convention he 1 d in Hobart 
in October- 1976. But, even here the Gover-nment chose to substantially 
modify the findings of the Convention and neglect many of its other 
recornmendati ons. 
Despite the shor-t term implications of the Bills the real change 
anticipated by the 11 Simultaneous Elections 11 proposal was to ensure that 
the elections for 
Satur>clay, 26 February., .1.9?7. 
the House of Rep-
resentati ves and 
Sen ate 'v'le re he 1 d 
s i rnu1 taneous ly. 
Further Senators' 
terms \'JOul d hence·· 
forth extend for 
only two terms of 
the House of Rep-
resentati ves and 
not for six years 
as at present. The 
11Senate Casual 
Vacancies 11 Bill 
waul d mctke mana tory 
the filling of any vacancy by a member of the same political party as 
the retired or deceased Senator and the "Referendurns 11 Bill would allow 
~­o. 
electors in the Northem Ter't'itory and the Australian Capita 1 Territory 
to be counted in the national Vt')te in a referendum. TI-Je final Bill, 
"Retiring Age for Fedet~a1 Jud~Jes"9 would establish a retiring age of 
seventy for futur·e judges appointed to Fe de ra 1 Courts. 3• 
On the 21st May 1977 Tasmania voted 'No• to the Simultaneous 
Elections proposal and in so doing registered an even lower vote than 
that returned to the same proposal in 1974. On this occasion the 
referendum was presented by the Labor Government in conjunction with 
three other proposals entitled "Democratic Elections 11 , "Mode of Altering 
the Constitution" and 11 Local Government BodieS 11 • All were soundly 
denounced by the Liberal Opposition and defeated. But, the significance 
of this vote to this Simultaneous Elections proposal is that, whilP in 
1974 it was only sponsored by one: political party, in 1977 all major 
Federal Parties advocated a 'Yes' vote as did the State Labor Govern-
ment. Yet, more Tasmanians voted 'No' to the proposal in 1977 than 
pte vi ous ly. i•Jhat factor·s then accentuated Tasmanians perception of 
this proposal in 1977? 
The situation clearly compels investigation and one must 
penetrate behind the Liberal Party at both Federal and State levels in 
order to understand hov1 and why hostility was engendered towards the 
proposals, and hm<J this opposition carne to be transmitted to the State. 
A number of factors stand out and one in particular is the 
sensitivity of Tasmania tovwrds the Senate and the potency of the state 1 s 
3. These are the shorthand terms used in the text for the referenda. 
6. 
l'ights issue which the 'No' campaign played upon. This transformed the 
S)multaneous Elections referendum into a question of a threat to the 
power and inf1 uence of the Senate and Comrnonwea lth encroachment upon 
St:-.te pONers and responsi '::Ji 1 ities. A • fear• campa·i gn against Canberra 
v1as \'/aged with the latter being accused mercilessly of an unwarranted 
grab for more p()\/1er. In Tasmania, the smallest of all the States, such 
claims are readily believed where a natural hostility and suspicion of 
Canberra always exists. 
The scope of this study will concentrate specifically on the 
Simultaneous Elections referendum because it was this proposal that 
was the source of the controversy in the Liberal Party. Furthermore 
Tasmanians again registered a 'No' vote to the referendum and it was 
against its impot·t that the • No• campaign was waged. The other refer-
enda were not without their own dissr'ltion and will of course be 
mentioned, to give a total view of the whole campaign. In general 
though they remained relatively uncontentious as was indicated by 
their success. 
In the first chapter a general background wi 11 be given to 
Tasmania•s n~sponse to referenda and this will be followed by an outline 
and rev·iew of the characteristics of referenda in Australia. 
The second chapter concentrates upon the conduct of the Simul-
taneous Elections referendum in Australia as a whole and heM and why the 
propos a 1 was just first opposed in Parliament. The argunEnts presented 
there by the leading protagonists will be examined while outside 
Parliament and in the media these basic contentions altered and became 
simplif·ied. As in Tasmania, the proposals were also the source of 
considerable d·issention vlithin the Liberal and National Country Patties 
7. 
of Queensland and Western Australia and the final section of the chapter 
will briefly consider events in these tv/0 States. 
Spearheaded by i·asmani a • s Libera 1 Senators tf,e controversy 
over the Simultaneous Elections referendum in the State waged bitterly 
and fiercely. Alligned with the Senators and also advocating a 'No' vote 
was the State Liberal Parliamentary Party but, before they adopted this 
stand, they were in the invidious position of being at odds with their 
own organisation and already had decided they would support the proposal. 
This was made much of by the State Labor Party who, though officially in 
support of the 'Yes• case, were otherwise apathetic to the proposal. 
In addition to the Labor Party a few lone Liberals and the Federal 
Government mounted the 'Yes' campaign. As polling day neared personal 
animosities and misleading propaganda took precedence and rarely was 
any serious and unemotional discussi,Jn of the merits of the proposals 
heard. 
The fi na 1 chapter examines those i nf1 uences which prevailed 
over Tasmania's resounding 'No' vote and in this light both Wildavsky's 
thesis and some genetal char~acteristics of referenda in Australia 
are re-assessed. It will be suggested that while a party vote did not 
appear to determine Tasman·i an's response to the referendum it is 
difficult to suggest any other single factor that may account for it. 
~1any seem to have been influential. Further it becorres apparent that 
Wildavsky's thesis must be slightly modified and while its basic tenents 
hold for the Simultaneous Elections referendum, they do not appear valid 
for the other three proposals. Finally some of the traditional assumptions 
about Tasmania's response to referenda will be re-examined in the light 
of the 1977 experiences. 
CHAPTER I 
THE REFEREN IN TAS[·1ANIA AND AUSTRALIA 
Constitutional referenda in Australia have a history of almost 
continual defeat and, while political scientists and historians have 
traced a pattern of failure, there is a substantial 1ack of agreement 
on the importance and influence exerted by the various factors. 
In Tasmania a similar situation prevails but is exacerbated by 
the State•s geographical isolation, the importance of personalities in 
politics and an over-riding fear of any diminution of her status as a 
member of the Commonwealth. \<lith these factors in mind a closer look 
must be taken of the State's voting record. 
THE TAS~1ANIAN RECORD 
The Tasmanian experience of refet··enda has been one whereby 
consistent 1 N0 1 major·ities have been returned except on the five occasions 
when the referenda have been accepted by the people, 1. and the two 
occasions when a • Yes' vote was recorded but the proposals were rejected. 
These occasions vvere the 1910 "Finance 11 referenda, a proposal that clearly 
favoured the State because of its small population and limited financial 
resources, and that concerning the control of Communists in 1951 where 
an apprehension emanating from geographical isolation determined the vote. 
On all other occasions Tasmania has recorded amongst the highest percent-
ages of 'No' votes. Of morE~ significance though is that since 1967 these 
'No' majorities have increased both in comparison with those recorded in 
earlier referenda and with those returned in other States. 
----------·-----~-------·-~-------
1. These occasions have been the 1906 11 Senate Elections", 1910 "Finance", 
1928 11 Finance 11 , 1946 11 Social Services" and 1967 11 Aborigines" referenda. 
9. 
In recent years Tasmania has shown a particular· se11sitivity to 
referenda concerning the Senate as is revealed by the lm11 vote r-eturned 
from the State to the four constitutional referenda relating to it: 
the Nexus proposal in 1967 which attempted to alter the balance of 
numbers beb1een Senators and !~embers of the House of Representatives; 
the Simultaneous Elections proposal of 1974; and the Simultaneous 
Elections and Senate Casual Vacancies proposals of 1977. Like the 1906 
Senate Elections referendum which 'tidied-up• the terms of Senators, 
the 1977 Senate Casual Vacancies proposal formalised an established 
practice and hence was ·relatively non controversial and passed without 
substantial opposition. But,as the other proposals indicated they 
could significantly weaken the power and influence of the Senate they 
were all soundly rejected. 
Sharman, 2 •. in a study of the role of the Senate as a State•s 
House, concluded that such threats to the position of the Senate fall 
on particularly receptive ears in the small states and especially so 
in Tasmania ¥1hich is five ti~res over represented in the Senate on a 
population basis. Hence, the Senate "can hardly avoid being exposed 
to the particular concerns of Tasmania 11 • 3• As a corollary to this he 
examined Tasmania's voting pattern for the Senate over the 1974 and 
1975 Double o·issolution elections which he considered "would be least 
favourable to the emergence of a distinct Senate vote 11 • 4• Commenting 
upon the part·i cul ar and unusal result Sharman said the "Tasmanian 
electors display a voting pattern for the Senate that is not shar"E!d 
r_· 
by any other state in the elections considered 11 .~. In conclusion he 
2. G.C. Sharman, 11 The Australian Senate as a State 1 s House", Unpublished 
manuscript, 1977. 
p. 15. 
4. Ibid. 
5. G. C. Sharman, Loc ~-i;i 1:.: ... ' p. 16. 
10. 
wrote that 11 It is plausible tu explain the behav·iour of Tasmanian 
senators and the voti r~g patten1s of Tasmanians as an attempt to exploit 
one of the few areas where the State is specially favoured, that of 
impact on the Senate and throu9h it9 access to a naticnal forum for 
airing Tasmanian concernsu. 6 • 
Other writers on Tasmania's voting behaviour in referenda have 
explained her negative stance in different terms. livingston 7• writing 
in the 1950's said that in referenda Tasmania 11 proc1aims her desire to 
maintain the position of the states against the grQltJing power of the 
federal government", 8 · and that her vote proclaims her "insistence on 
the prerogative of statehood". 9 • Other authors such as Crisp, 10 • Parker11. 
and Rydon 12 • tend simply to assume that her 'No' vote is indicative of 
a simple rejection of Federal control or reflection of her isolation 
from the mainstream of political ideas. 
Right from the earliest days of Federation Tasmania's predomin-
ant 'No' vote was distinctive and Joyner13 • writing of the 1911, 1913 
and 1919 referenda finds it difficult to explain in comparison with 
those dominant factors which prevailed over the 'No' vote in New South 
------------------·--· -------------· 
6. G. C. Sharman, Qe..!__.~.:Lb_, p.l9. 
7. W.S. Livingston, ralism and Constitutional Chanqe, Oxford University Press , Oxford, 1956 .------------------------%-
8. W.S. Livingston, LQ_<;:. Cit., p.145. 
9. W.S. Livingston, L~, p.l46. 
10. L.F. Crisp, Australian N anal Gave 3rd edition, Longmans, 
~1e 1 bourne, 
11. R.S. Parker, 11 Tht:: People and the Constitution" in G. SavJer, (Ed.) 
l'ism in Austra"iia Cheshire, fvlJ€1boume, 1949. 
12. J. Rydon, "Prices and Incomes Referendums 1973: The Pattern of 
Failure", liti Vol. 9, No.1, May 1974. 
13. C. \Joyner, Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1963. 
11. 
Wales. The hypothesis which he suggested was that due to Tasmania's 
small size and population, and island state, "electors would be most 
likely to reject extended CommonvJea1th power on the grounds that the 
State would suffer from acts of a Parlian1ent under th0 supposed domin-
at·ion of the three large eastern States 11 • 14 • However, as similar 
conditions applied in I..Jestern Australia where continuous 'Yes' majorities 
were recorded and a similar 11 anti-eastern 11 feeling prevailed this 
hypothesis he considered had doubtful validity. 
Like Joyner, Wildavsky is also at a loss to explain Tasmania's 
vote and writing on the 1926 referenda he considered that contradictory 
influences prevailed in the State. On the one hand 11 0f state abuse at 
the hands of the Corrmonwea 1 th Government, (and) on the other the 
realization of the State's helplessness in the face of strikes vrhich 
cut it off from the mainland 11 • 15 · Yet four electorates in the St!'\te 
recorded a double 'No' majority and the other one, Darwin (now named 
Braddon) an inexplicable double 'Yes' majority. Wildavsky concluded 
that unknown local conditions must have contributed both to this extra-
ordinary result and to the general State vote as vJell. 
Of particular importance to this study is Tasmania's vote in 
the 1974 referenda. On this occasion the proposals were all defeated 
in almost all the States and the only State to record a 'Yes• majority 
to the Simultaneous Elections proposal was New South Wales. Tasmania 
recorded the highest 'No' vote follov1ed hy \~estern Austtalia and 
Queensland and these States also returned 'No' majorities, albeit narrow, 
·---------··----
14. C. Joyner, !::..~C·i~..:...' p.84. 
15. A. Wildavsky, Q~ __ Cit_~_, p.103. 
12. 
in 1977. The proposal to allol'l Territorians to vote in referenda was 
also included in the referenda of 1974 but \vas placed in conjunction with 
a very contentious Bi 11 that attempted to reduce the requirements for the 
successful passage of a referendum from a majority of 1:he States to only 
haH. Hence to some extent it was overlooked as the other was 
vehemently opposed by the Liberal Party. 
The referenda in 1974 were held in conjunction with the Double 
Di ssol uti on Election which almost cornp lete 1y overshadowed them. The 
Liberal-Country Par·ty opposed all the proposals and in their election 
campaign exploited and confused them with Labor Party policies. Very 
little discussion of the constitutional issues was heard and most electors 
remained confused as to their import. However, while the Labor Government 
was returned to power the r·eferenda were defeated thus belying the claim 
that the 1974 result was determined by a straight Party vote. Even in 
Tasmania where a 11 Labor Party candidates \'tere returned the referenda 
was rejected t'esoundi ngly. In pa rti cu1 ar the Simultaneous Elections 
proposal received only 41.37% support though this was higher- than that 
recorded for the other proposals. 
Clearly then the referenda preser.t a rather complex pattern o'f 
voting behav·iour in Tasmania but, before the 1977 proposals are examined 
in detail, some account must be taken of the general characteristics and 
features of t~e renda throughout Austra"lia. 
ITUTION.A.L REFE IN AUSTR1\LIA 
Section 128 of the Cons ti tuti on empm1ers the Government of the 
day to present Bills for amendment of the Cons ti tuti on to the people 
once they have been passed by Parliament. The two major provisions 
for their successful carriage are that the proposals must be passed by 
13. 
a majority of states and u. ma~~ority of the people. To date the four 
referenda under consideration brought to thirty six the number of proposals 
presented to the people since Federation on eighteen distinct occasions. 
The amendment provisior1s of the Australian Constitution were 
adapted from those of the Swiss Constitution with modi fi cations based on 
American experience. At the time of Federation these provisions were 
considered extremely flexible and liberal but this notion was shortlived 
and, prior to 1977, only five of thirty two Constitutional Alteration 
Acts had been successful. By contrast Australians have acquiesced to 
the increase in Federal powers brought down by interpretati ms of the 
High Court and in several instances a High Court decision has reversed 
previous referenda. 16 • 
Unlike the United States Constitution there is no provision 
under Section 128 for any State to suggest a referendum, neither 1s 
there the ptovision for the initiative as in Switzerland. The Ji.ustra1ian 
Constitution a11m'IS for the initiative for an amendment to rest only with 
Federal Parliament though there have been suggestions to alter this 
situation in recent years. Numerous proposals have been presented in 
Parliament but the majority of these have not been put to the people. 
Of the th·irty six referenda to date tilfenty four were held prior to 1951, 
including the Communist referendum, whilst ten have been conducted in 
the 1970's. 
Proposals to alter the Constitution have to be supported by 
the party in Government and hence most issues become highly divisive 
---------------------' 
16. In 1970 the Commonwea1th lttas given povver over companies that had 
been denied it ·in the re renda of 1911, 1913, 1919, 1926 and 1944, 
and in 1965 over aviation that had been defe din 1937. 
14. 
along party lines. Over the seventy-six years since Feder,'l.tion the 
non-Labor Parties,. with fifty-six year·s of office, have presented 
seventeen proposals, and the Labor Par·ty, with nineteen years of office, 
nineteen proposals. Only one Labor sponsored referendum, (the 1946 
11 Socia1 Set'vices" referendum), to seven non-Labor sponsored proposals 
have been successful. Generally, Labm~ referenda have involved greater 
and more far reaching transfer of power than have those of the non-Labor 
Parties and this has been in keeping with the Labor Party's avowed 
intention to reform the Constitution. All successful referenda have 
been supported by both Federal political parties though as previously 
indicated this is not always a guarantee of success. 
Parties of either persuasion have a history of intErnal dissention 
caused by referenda where the opinions and considerations of the Federal 
bodies have not always been shared by their state counterparts. This 
app1 i es particularly to those parties who sponsor the referenda. 
Organised interest groups, other than political pa~ties, also tern to 
play a more active role in referendum campaigns than in the same for 
elections, and their degree of participation usually bears a direct 
relationship to the extent to which they believe their welfare is 
threatened. The 1977 referenda are noticeable for the minimal involve-
ment of interest groups but 11 experts 11 and 11 intellectua1s" did add the·ir 
weight in support of either case. 
Like the Simultaneous Election proposal the majority of amend-
ments have been concerned vrith a redistribution of State and Federal 
powers in the direction of the Commonwealth Government. Many proposals 
have recurred over· the years and those most often submitted have been 
concerned with the role of the Senate, industrial power~ power ovc~t 
trade and commerce, rnonopolies, trusts, rnar·keting, companies and pO\\er 
15. 
l'elating to soc-ial services. Accordingly many of the issues have met 
with fierce, but often inconsistent, resistance from the States at such 
attempts by the Federa 1 Gow~rnment to encroach upon their powers. This 
has usually meant that the isst~9S have become highly contentious and 
such a situation has customarily ensured their defeat. By contrast 
those which have succeeded like those of 1977 have been of a relatively 
non-controversial nature, or more importantly have had the support of 
both major political parties. In any event they have not been 11 envisaged 
as constituting serious threats to the independence of the states or the 
freedom of the individua1 11 • 17 • However, as was evidenced by the 1967 
Nexus and the 1977 Simultaneous Elections referenda, joint Federal party 
support for any proposal does not always ensure its acceptance by the 
national electorate and a small but vocal group of dissidents can hold 
sway over the nation. 
Referendum proposals have been put to the people in a variety 
of ways. On several occasions, most noticeably the 1946 Fourteen Powers 
referendum, more than one proposal has been included under one Bi 1l 
while at other times referenda have been put to the people separately 
or held in conjunction vJith general elections. There appears to be no 
optimum means of presentation as the several methods have all been 
unsuccessful at various times. In recent year·s the 1967 Nexus and 
Abm~igines referenda vJere presented separately and while one was success-
ful the other was defeated vJhile in 1973 and 1974 all proposals were 
defeated: the first vJas held separately and the latter in conjunction 
with a general election. Contrary to popular opinion the 1967, 1973 
and 1977 referenda appear to show that the electorate can and do 
distinguish between proposals presented on the same occasion. 
1 7. J. Rydon, 9J?~.--(~_:L~.-=-' p. 22. 
16. 
What is of particular importance about this information on 
referendum presentation is that \'lhen referenda are held in conjunction 
with a general election party discipline reigns supreme over any intra-
party conflict. As the assumption of power is at stak1~ the facade of 
" 
unity within a party is strictly maintained while, when held separately 
as in 1977, this does not seem to be as important and groups are freer 
to adopt their own position. 
Many referenda have been called a 11 Smokescreen 11 to detract the 
public's attention from other more deep seated problems of the governrrent 
and oppos it i ons 1 i ke to make much of this argument. Furthermore, as 
arnendments are customarily submitted to meet specific requirements or 
problems of the current governrrent and often the result of compromises 
or changes, doubts as to the sincerity of the proposals are continually 
raised. This situation is only exacerbated by the history of incr'1sist-
ency in the political parties' approach to referenda. As many proposals 
have recurred over the years party attitudes have changed depending on 
whether they have been in governrrent or opposition. 
A familiar accusation raised against the referenda concerns 
the minimal public discussion of either the constitutional or federal 
issues raised by the proposals. The tendency is in most cases for mis-
representation to deve 1 op into absurdities or fat· the argurrents to 
degenerate into simple plat'itudes. In any event the propaganda of the 
campaigns takes precedence over 1 ogi ca 1 cr reasoned discussion and 
largely bolsters the 1 No' case because it goes unanswered. The other 
effect of the propaganda is that 11 opposition to extended federal powers 
is easily converted into a 'fear• campaign as to the possible consequences 
of ~)ranting such pm11ers. vJhile such campaigns often include gross 
distol·'tions and even absurdities ~tJhich most do not take seriously, they 
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may create sufficient misgivings for many votet~s to play safe - •When 
in doubt vote 'No•• may be the most effective slogan in a referendum11 • 18• 
This is particularly so as the proposals are often wordy and incompre-
her.sible to the average citizen. 
Opinion polls attempting to predict the outcome of referenda 
have been consistently unreliable and the 1977 experience in Tasmania 
was an excellent example of its questionable findings. One theory as 
to this difficulty is that people only make their decisions to a 
referendum just prior to voting and hence the difficulty for pollsters. 
The press also play an important part in moulding public opinion but 
like political parties their stance on proposals is not always an 
indicator of voting behaviour. As in 1967, 1973 and 1977 the press 
consistently favoured an affirmative vote but a negative response was 
returned. 
Many of the char-acteristics of the referenda just described 
have recurred in the literature where some authors have extrapolated 
on one or more such features and attempted to generalise on the failure 
of all referenda. Others have attempted to find more deep-rooted 
reasons for their lack of success while fm'l if any have given consid-
eration to a successful referendum. 
\~ri ters prior to the 1940 • s were pre-occupied with the 
const·itutional and legal implications of the provisions and saw, in 
its repeated i nabi 1 ity to amend out-moded parts, a major short-corning 
19 20. 
of the Constitution. Authors such as Quick and Garran, · Canaway, 
18. J. Rydon, Qp...! Cit •. , p.24. 
uick and R.R. Garran, The Annotated Constit 
20. A.P. Canaway, The~ 
P n~ss ~ Oxford, 
Angus, 
lute of Fede ism in Austral a Oxford University 
lH. 
ltJarner, 21. lflani2· and others wrote extensive·ly on the Constitution 
and many of them also made considerable contribut-ions to the 1927-1929 
Constitutional Convention called by the Ear·l-Page Govermr.ent. This 
C;)ve rnment was concerned with the di ffi culti es surrounding the Cons ti-
tution and called the Convention to attempt to examine it and make 
recommendations for its impr·ovement. The documents 23 • from this Convention 
show all the early considerations of the referendum provisions. 
In the late 1940's authors began to go beyond a mere consti-
tutional interpretation and look for more political reasons that could 
account for their defeat, and from this time on writers took one of 
three approaches: a general discussion on referenda, a focus on a 
specif·ic referendum; or a discussion of a particular aspect or issue 
as raised by one or more referenda. 
R.S. Parker's24• article is one of the definitive general studies 
on the referenda and serves as a continual though now limited source of 
reference. In exploring the issues Parker maintained that questions of 
constitutional alteration become political issues and as such people 
vote along party lines. However, as the strict party vote cancels each 
other out, the ct"'itical factor must lie vJith the unattached middle group 
of voters. After examining several influences on these voters he finds 
no sig·lnificant answer but, by constructing a table ccrnparing referendum 
results with an estimate of the current political situation in each 
---------
21. K.D. vJarner, An Introduction to Some Problems of Australian Federalism, 
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22. F.R. Bland, (Ed.), 
Printer, Sydney, 1 
rnment in Australia 2nd Edition, GovernnJt~nt 
23. and Hinutes of Ev·idence Royal Cornm·ission on the Consti-
on 
24. R.S. Parker, • Cit. 
rra, 1929, and _B~poJ::_t._, Hoyal Comnrission 
Pdnter, Canberra, 1929. 
state, he finds an eighty percent correlation. These findings though 
he concedes are of rather speculative quality. 
In complete cor.trast to Parker, P.H. Partridge25 • examines 
from a federalist viewpoint the paradoxical situation that Australians 
have clearly acquiesced to the Commonwealth's acquisition of pm1er by 
indirect means but have opposed any direct moves to this effect. He 
attributes this dichotomy to four reasons: that the policy implied 
by the referendum is rejected and the elector is uncertain about it, 
and, while he distrusts the government he is also nervous about tt"e 
expansion of government and in consequence considers that the States 
should retain the pm'>'er. Such interpretations still retain their 
validity particularly in the small States where a traditional distrust 
of Canberra exists along with a strong belief in State rights and 
respon~ibilities. 
The on 1y author to specifically write on the amendment of 
constitutions in Federal democracies is W.S. Livingston26 · and his 
chapter on Australia is the most comprehensive account available on 
both the constitutional and political aspects of referenda. ~1any of 
these have been adumbrated in the previous section but he does stress 
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that state parties often differ from the opinirns of their Federal 
counterparts over referendum issues. Also outlined, albeit very briefly, 
is a proposal shov1ing a slight correlat·ion between the results of 
referenda and Senate composition but he draws no real crnclusion from 
25. P.H. Partridge, "The Politics of Federalism", in Federalism: An 
Austra'l"l an aubilee Study, G. Sawer (Ed.), Angus andRobe-rE-on:--
~leTb ou rne-, ··r9t)2. ______ .. ,.__ 
26. W.S. Livingston, Op. Cit. 
When discuss,ing the continual failure of most referenda 
Livingston is forced to fall back on opinions similar to those of 
Partridge. In particular hf~ considers the electorate is ignorant of 
the Constitution and cannot divorce referendum questions from persons 
or politics while on the other hand he considers many electors do not 
necessarily vote a long party 1 i nes. These features were particularly 
noticeable in Tasmania during the campaign of 1977. 
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The role of the States is examined by Livingston in same detail, 
especially the t·equirement that referenda must be passed by a majority 
of all States. This provision of the Constitution was included to 
protect the smaller states from being overwhelmed by the larger but, 
as some small states have proved more willing to approve chmges than 
have others, it has not worked in its conceived form. Western Australia, 
a small state, has until recent years been most willing to accept changes 
and this position Livingston considers as difficult to understand. Not 
withstanding, he assumes that as that State was dissatisfied with fed-
eralism any change could be regarded there as for· the better. In 
contrast Tasmania, the smallest state, appears to have a phobia about 
any change as his remarks related earlier on reveal. 
L.F. Crisp27• in a general discussion on referenda investigates 
the t''easons behind their continual failure. Three features he considers 
could contr-ibute to this fact the first being associated with inherent. 
and procedural difficulties of the refer'3ndum provisions. Included 
that the greater powet~ is dispersed the more freed0t11 is available to 
the individual; a nation largely ignorant of the Constitution; the 
2 7 • L. F. C ri s p , Q.E.!._f i t . 
21. 
workings of Federalism; compulsory voting; the double majorities; and 
the wording of the referenda. The second reason he considers to be 
the party-pol iti ca 1 factor 1r1hi ch works against any ration a 1 and dis-
p~ssionate discussion of the referendum proposals particularly as most 
oppositions cannot resist the temptation to oppose them and parties 
have difficulty in presenting a united and consistent approach across 
all fronts. The third factor is the ideological considerations which 
are distinct yet interwoven with the party political factor. To Crisp 
the consequence of conflict on this level is the resultant propag:mda 
which, in combination with inertia and discontent, invariably ensures 
defeat. 
A number of authors have concentrated upon specific referenda 
either with the purpose of a simple description of events or, through 
such analysis, to draw broad generalisations of the nature of r'eferenda. 
Very little has been written on some referenda like the 1906 and 1910 
referenda but the 1911, 1913 and 1919 referenda have been examined by 
C. Joyner. 28• On these occasions the Comrnonvmalth attempted to increase 
its powers in the areas of trade, comrnercf!, conciliation and arbitration 
and Joyner maintains that they v,1ere defeated because of the influence 
which interest groups exerted on the electorate. These interest groups 
were highly motivated by the unfavourable economic and political 
consequences they felt would follow from a •ves• victory and thus ardently 
campaigned for a 1 No' vote. 
As mentioned earlier the 1926 referenda were studied by 
A. \.<J-ildavsky29 • who examined the divis·ive effects that a referendum has 
on political parties. Another of his theses is that inherent in a 
______________________ ,. _________ , ____ _ 
28. C. Joyner, Q[?_:_ __ Gjt. 
29. A. Wildavsky, 9P~it~ 
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referendum proposal ·is an attempt to alter the balance of pnwer and 
this fact alone exacerbates conflict as some groups stand to gain while 
()thers lose. This may be observed across Federal lines as was the 
case in the referendum under study where many of the dissenting 
Senator·s savJ in this proposal a serious attempt to diminish their power 
and influence. 
Other authors who have examined the earlier referenda are 
E. Mitchel1 30 • on the 1928 referendum and K.H. Bailey and L.F. Giblin 31. 
em the 1937 proposals. The 1944 referendum has been covered by a number 
of writers in varying ways some of whom are I. Milner, 32 • J.L. Paton, 33 • 
P.C. Spender, 34• P.H. Drummond 35 • and P. Hasluck. 36 • The latter 
emphasised the stands taken by Menzies and non-Labor groups which acted 
as a catalyst for the formation of the Liberal Party and this same theme 
was takP.n up by l~.J. Waters 37• who shovJed how the proposals conclusively 
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united the disparate groups. Purportedly on the 1951 referendum, 
L. Hebb's 38• book was in actuality, less concerned with the referendum 
than w·ith a description of t~e controvery aroused by C'Jmmunism in the 
1950's, along with discussion oi .. questions of freedom and democracy. 
The only examination of the 1967 referenda have been from their 
impact on Aboriginal society while the 1973 11 Pri ces and Incomes" 
referenda have been considered by Joan Rydon. 39 • This author describes 
all those salient features of the referendum that combined to contribute 
to its failure and many have already been outlined. Her account is an 
excellent resunlf of the failings of the referendum in Australia and as 
well she is one of the few authors who attempts to correlate a refer-
endum result with the most recent general election. A very brief account 
of the 1974 referenda has been undertaken by C.J. Lloyd and G.S. Rei d40 • 
who consider the implications of the referenda and relate them to the 
broader principles of Labor policy. 
The literature on constitutional refer-enda from a particular 
vievJpoint has concentrated mainly on constitutional, legal or judicial 
interpr'etations of the provisions. Other authors such as J.E. Richard-
son41· outline the Commont<lealth-State discussions called to review 
the Constitution and it ltJas purportedly one such Convention that gave 
the Prime ~1inister his modus operandi for the 1977 referenda. 
39. J. Ry don , Op. Ci h 
40. C.J. Lloyd and G.S. Reid, Out of the vJilderness: The Retu of 
Lab~~' Cassell, ~~1bourne, 
41. J.E. Richardson, Patterns of Aus ~.~~~.~~.c~~~~~~~~~:~-:-~~~~~~ 
Canberra, 1973. 
24. 
I. Campbell, 42 • in a theme similar to those of Hasl uck and 
Waters, considers the ·impact that refer·enda have had on the structures 
and activities of participating groups and maintains that referenda 
hiive accelerated the development of a federal structure by political 
parties. The issue of Commonwealth policy on industrial relatirns has 
also been another aspect that has come in for special attention with 
articles on this subject by R. Martin, 43• 0. de R. Foenander, 44 · 
R.M. Egg1eston 45 • and R.J. Hawke. 46 • In other fields the referenda 
have been used by Jean Holmes 47 • to shm\1 how state networks of communi-
cation have more salience than nationwide networks and by D. Kemp48. 
who shm'ls how state voting patterns on referenda are diverging rather 
than becoming more homogeneous. G.C. Sharman, 49 • has used the results 
to show hO\IJ the Senate is particularly a small state's house while 
50 LF. Crisp • is the only author, albeit briefly, to write on the 
official 'Yes' and 'No' cases published to explain the import of the 
42. I. Campbell, 11 Parties and the Referendum Process", Australian 
QuarJerlY_, Vo.34, No.2, 1962. 
43. R. Mar·tin, "Industrial Relations 11 in D.M. Gibb and A.~~. Hannan (Eds.) 
~!:'~~-~.:?..~ cis i_Q~! :. Pol i ti_c;~_US..?_~-~1IJ-.19.!..f!__Century A us tra 1 i a, 
Heinemann Educational Australia, fiJelbourne, ·1937. 
44. 0. de R. Foenander, Tm<Jards Industrial Peace in Australia, lvlelbourne, 
1937. ---
45'" R.M. Eggleston, 11 Industria1 Re1ations 11 in R. Else Mitchell (Ed.), 
Essa~_2.!}._J_he Australian Constitution, Sydney, 1952. 
46. R.J. Hav'lkes, "CommomAJealth Arbitration Court - Legal Tribunal or 
Econom~c Legislature?", Annua·l Law Review University of \>Jestern 
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50. L.F. Crisp, 11 The Official For and Against Referenda Casesu, 
~5_, Vo1.9, 1974. 
of the Bin~. t~any other facets of referenda still remain u11examined 
and one of these areas is the effect of the findings of Public Opinion 
Polls. 
In 1975 Australia faced a constitutional crisis and ~,;temming 
from this a number of books have appeared questioning the importance 
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and relevance of the Constitution. Continually emphasised is the failure 
of the referendum provision to achieve any sort of change let alone 
meaningful reforms. These books edited by G. Dutton 51. and S. Encel, 
D H d E TL 52 • th t b th b • • f • orne an • 110mpson appear en o e e eg1 nm ng o a nevJ 
trend to re-examine the Cons tit uti on and thereby the referendum in 
Australia. 
Thus the major themes which emerge from this Chapter are that 
in both Tasmania and Australia the propensity is to vote 'No' to a 
referendum. Generalisations as to the causes behind this fact are 
di ffi cult to assess and in Tasmania, whi 1e previous referenda and other 
studies have shown that the State has a particular sensitivity towards 
the Senate, this by no means accounts for all referenda. Similarly 
\'lhile one author is of the opinion that a state's rights issue has 
determined Tasmania • s vote others, after examining particular referenda 
do not find this hypothesis adequate. Yet they are at a loss to present 
any other valid reason which may account for Tasmania's vote and simply 
have to fall back on the assumption that unknown local conditions 
prevailed. 
51. G. Dutton, (Ed.), Reeublican Australia, Sun, 1~elbourne, 1977. 
52. S. Encel, D. Horne and E. Thompson, (Eds.), Change the Rul?s, 
Penguin, ~lelbourne, 1977. 
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In a similar manner there is no real agreernent on those factors 
which have caused r;:derenda in Aus tra 1 i a to be continually defeated. 
Early theories attributed a straight party vote as bei:1g responsible for 
their failure but this theory h<:.s been seriously challenged as even united 
support at the federal level is not always sufficient for success. 
Furthermore parties regularly become divided internally over a referendum 
and this dissention usually spreads to State levels. 
As these hypotheses have not always resulted in satisfactory 
explanations other authors have searched for more pragmatic reasons. 
Inherent and procedural difficulties in the nature of the referendum 
and the attitude of the Australian people towards both the Constitution 
and change appear nmv to contribute~ a significant part to the defeat 
of a referendum. Generally however, a corrbinati on of many factors 
determines the fi net'l outcome of each referendum and with this in ndnd 
attention must now focus on the controversy surrounding the 1977 
Simultaneous Elections at the national level. 
CHAPTER II 
OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULTANEOUS ELECTIONS REFERENDUM 
In the Libera 1-Nati on a 1 Country Party ( L-NCP) Governnent 
opposition arose to the Simultaneous Elections proposal because of the 
influence exerted by two factors. On the one hand some Senators saw the 
proposal as a threat to the power and influence of the Senate, while on 
the other the inept handling of the issue by the executive allowed a 
confrontation situation to develop. As the referendum was not held in 
conjunction \'Jith a general election party discipline was not as important 
as it otherwise may have been and groups were freer to adopt their own 
stan d. 
Intra party conflict developed in the federal Liberal Party 
and it is necessary therefore to examine this in more detai 1. Also 
considered will be the argurrents presented in Parliament in support or 
opposition to the Bill and how these became communicated to the public. 
A national perspective will be taken on these aspects of the controversy 
while the concluding section of the Chapter will exarrrine the situation 
in Queensland and ~~estern Australia which was comparable to that which 
prevailed in Tasmania. 
PASSAGE OF THE BILL THROUGH PARLIAMENT 
In the Liberal Party dissatisfaction with sorre or all of the 
referenda began in the Party room where, as one Senator related, the 
Government refused to discuss them in any detai 1 and "stand-over" tactics 
were used. Many Senators, particularly some from Tasmania \'/ere affronted 
at this di sp 1 ay of executive power as ~'!e 11 as the dis respectful behaviour 
it had shovm in failing to have had prior consultations with senior 
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members of the Party. The first intimation a number of Senators claimed 
they had had of the proposals was a newspaper report. Added to this, 
and aggravating the tensions, were some of the statements made by the 
Government Leader in the Senate, Senator Withers, concerning the 
dissenting Senators and the proposals, and the cajolery of the Prime 
Minister. Beyond this the Simultaneous Elections proposal, and to a 
lesser extent the other proposals, \'Jere opposed on their own merits by 
those who believed it would have a deleterious effect on the Senate. 
Others vJere disturbed by the complete about face of the Government and 
because the Simultaneous Elections proposal was unnecessary to achieve 
its aims. 
Despite this controversy amongst its own ranks the Government 
went ahead with the required legislation and, concurrent with the news-
paper reports of 16 February, introduced the Bills into the House of 
Representatives where they passed through all stages without delay. 
In the Senate, the Bills met \'lith imrrediate opposition 
particularly those concerning Simultaneous Elections and Senate Cas ua 1 
Vacanc-ies. A number of Senators v1ere sufficiently incensed by them to 
tlweaten to cross the floor and a hasty Senate Party meeting was called 
on 22 February in an attempt to avert a confrontation situation. Those 
concer-ned, hm"Jever, were not appeased and on the same day, accompanied 
by Senator Harradine, 1· they crossed the floor and voted against the 
Govet·nment and Opposition on tvw motions associated with the Bills• 
passage: to waive the t~tJenty-one day adjournment required by 
Senate Standing Orders for Constitution Alteration Bills2• and to 
1. Senator Harradine is an Independent Senator for Tasmania. 
2. The Labor Government in 1974 had also moved for the suspension of 
these Standing Orders and had then met with considerable antagonism 
from the L-NCP Opposition. 
' 
postpone the debates so that they would coincide with a Senate broad-
cast day. 3• 
The Senators involved in this act of defianc& against their 
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own Party were Senators Cormack of Victoria, Jessop of South Australia, 
Martin, Wood, and Bonner of Queensland, Sim of Western Australia, and 
Rae, Wright, Walters, Townley and Archer from Tasmania; all predominantly 
Senators from the small States. Of these Senators, only Senators 
Jessop and Archer voted with the Government on the third reading of 
the Simultaneous Elections Bill. The debate on the other three Bills 
was guillotined by the Government, again causing friction and,while 
Senators Walters and Bonner as well as Senators Jessop and Archer 
voted for the Senate Casual Vacancies Bill, only Senators Wright and 
Wood opposed the Retiring Age for Federal Judges Bi 11. The Referendums 
Bill passed through the Senate withoJt opposition. Thffie Senators, 
joined later by other ll'lembers of the Party, including Senator Dra<e-
Brockman of Western Australia formed the 'No' Campaign Committee to 
fight the Simultaneous Elections proposal. Senator Sir t~agnus Cormack 
was elected chairman and Senator Rae campaign director and spokesman. 
In voting against the Government Senator Martin was prompted 
to submit her resignation as Deputy Government \~!rip in the Senate ar.d 
her actions were given wide coverage in the press. In addition they 
had considerable repercussions in the Government as it indicated the 
seriousness with which the dissenting Senators viewed the Bills. 
3. The Government thl~oughout the referendum debates in the Senate 
contrived for them to take p·lace at the most inconvenient times 
and those least likely to be heard over national radio. This was 
yet another ctor which fuelled the dissent·ing Senators 
antagonism to the proposals. 
Source: Na·tional 1'imes 
Pebl•uary 28--::::-~'>iarah 5, 19 ?7. 
A hasty rneeting of Ministers 
was called to discuss the 
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embarrassment caused by the 
nationwide publicity given to 
the so called "rebel" 4• Senators 
and this meeting was reported 
to have also discussed the four 
a~rendments to the Simultaneous 
Elections Bill that the Senators 
proposed as acceptable altern-
atives. Such awendrnents, they 
c1 aimed, would not have compi"Om-
ised the aim of the referenda and 
as well would have satisfied their objections to the cunent Bill. The 
Govermre.nt though refused to consider them and they were soundly defeated 
after the debate had been gagged. 
The defection from Party ranks by the eleven Liberal Senators 
vtas an unprecedented act of defiance motivated as much in the early 
stages by the Government's 11 Steam-ro11er11 tactics and clumsy handling 
of the Bills as by the proposals themselves. Little of this aspect 
\1/as reported in the press as the 11 rebe1" Senators were reluctant to 
publicly denounce their ovm Party. Senator Martin's staterr.ent after her 
resignation \lias one of the fe~<J repm·ted and she said, 11 l'm opposed to 
the Bill in any event, and the other part of my opposition stems from 
the way the Government is going about it". 5 · Later Sit t··1agnus Cormack 
4. This term was given to the eleven dissenting Liberal Senators by 
the rnedi a. 
5. ThUl~sday, 24 February, 1977. 
in speaking to the Bill sa·id, 11 I first wish to add strongly and 
emphatically opposition to tht:! manner in which these Bills ca1re before 
this House ••• All was unexplained by the Government. An inexplicable 
timetable was presented". 6• 
In addition it was also intimated that there was even more 
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widespread opposition to the Simultaneous Elections Bill than the vote 
indicated and several mainland newspapers 7• ran articles on the possib-
ility of seven NCP Senators crossing the floor to vote against the 
Government. These Senators were reported to have been \'!On over to the 
Government side on the argurrent that voting on the Bill to hold the 
referenda does not amount to supporting the proposal. Privately some 
Ministers were also reported to be opposed to the Bill, and it was 
rumoured several had considered resigning. In the House of Represent-
atives, where the haste with which the proposal had been presented had 
disguised its real implications, a number of MP's later refused L sign 
the covering letter to the Electoral Officer which accompanied the •ves• 
case. Hence the Bills illuminated the already divisive tendencies in 
the Federal Liberal Party and without these divisions it is difficult 
to imagine that such a serious conflict could have developed on the 
political level. In addition the Prime ~Hnister and his colleagues 
in the t~·i ni st ry appeared to have needlessly antagonised pov.,rerful groups. 
According to Wildavsky, the party proposing the referenda 
customarily has the most difficulty in presenting a consistent approach. 
This was true of the Liberal Party and the Labor Party also had 
their di ffi cuiti es. HH:! Party had proposed the Simultaneous 
Elections and Referendums Bills in 1974 and Caucus again decided to 
support the Bills despite questions as to Labor support for a Liberal 
uroposa 1 and the Libera 1 Party • s vo lte-face. However, the haste w·i th 
which the Government had introduced the Bills had blurred the real 
implications of the Senate Casual Vacancies proposal to the Labor 
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Party. This proposal, if successful would almost certainly mean that 
the Caucus Chairman Senator Brown would lose his seat at the forthcoming 
Senate election 8• and as a result there was considerable pressure within 
the Party to have their earlier decision reversed. The Leader of the 
Opposition, Mr. Whitlam argued strongly against this move. He believed 
that the Party v;~as firmly coriTrlitted to such a policy and in addition 
he emphasised that the propos a 1 was presented at the Hobart Cons tit uti on a l 
Convention by a Labor delegate. By a narrow margin the decision was 
upheld and the issue then faded from the national .controversy. 
In 1 ater events the Victorian Executive did attempt to have the 
National Executive of the ALP reverse their decision of support for the 
proposals but this again failed. From evidence supplied by newspaper 
reports and political commentaries however, the Labor Party in almost 
all States only paid lip-service to the Party's directive to support the 
proposals and Mr. \~hitlam and Mr. Hayden were amongst the very fe\1 to 
campaign actively for a 'Yes' vote. 
DEBATE ON THE GILL 
-------·---------
In the House of Representatives the debate on the Constitutional 
Alteration Bills v1as extremely brief due to their hastened passa~Je through 
that House. In the Senate however, this was not the case and the argu-
ments heard there on the Simultaneous Elections Bi 11 are of importance 
8. Senator Brown had been te legated to third pas iti on on the Victorian 
Senate ticket for the for-thcomi nCJ elections, and, as the successful 
passage? of the Sen Casual Vacancies Bill vwuld mean that Senator 
Lewis, the replacement Senator for the late Senator Greerwwod. did not 
stand r rt.~-e·lect·ion until 1981, only five seats ~vould be coming up · 
for re-election. It would be most unlikely in that event for 
Victoria to return three Labor Senators. 
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as they sho~tJ the real issues raised by the referendum and tre pat~tic~ 
ularities surrounding the opposition to the Bill. Further, as the 
majority of Senators confused the import of the Bill with its short 
term implications and the Government•s questionable motives 
the debate thrm"is light on the nature of the referendum in Australia. 
The Bills were presented to the Senate by the then Minister 
for Veterans' Affairs, Senator Ourak,9· and the Simultaneous Elections 
proposal was debated at great length by many members of the House. 
In his opening speech the Senator mvelt heavily upon tre resolutions 
of the 1976 Hobart Constitutional Convention and indicated that the 
Government took seriously its suggested constitutional reforms. The 
present Bi11 he emphasised had also been the subject of a recommendation 
of the ~Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Revie\I>J of 1958 
a.nd 1959. 
After outlining the present situation of the disparate terms 
of Senators and Mernbers of the House of Representatives the Minister 
acknowledged that it was theoretically possible that elections for the 
two Houses could be held concurr-ently, however, he clain~d that in these 
days, "the exigencies of political life are such that synchronisation 
on this basis is difficult to maintain 11 • 10 • Other reasons in stpport 
of the proposal ~tJere the possibility of an excessi\e number of elections 
bet\•!een 1978 and 1981, the cost involved to the taxpayer and the benefit 
to Parl-iament in that the will of the people would be reflected 
simultaneously in both Houses. 11 Incidentalull. to the proposal was the 
9. As at the time of \1/riting Senator Durak is Attorney General follow-
ing the resi~)nation of t~r. Ellicott from that portfol·io. 
10. Debates Vol. 2, 15-17 February, 1977, p.l95. 
11. Ibid. 
provision for the CommonvJealth Par1iarrent to assume the State's role 
in issuing the writs for Senate elections and its final benefit was in 
the removal of a number of technicalities associated with sections of 
the present Constitution. 
Senators Missen and Button led the debates on the Bill for 
the Government and the Opposition respectively and many of the propos-
itions already out 1 i ned We're augmented in varying degrees by them 
along with roost other speakers. In particular amongst those aspects 
of the Bill that were emphasised was the duty of the Government to put 
resolutions of the Constitutional Convention to a referenda of the 
people and that the Bill ensured for the future that elections for the 
Senate and the House of Representatives would be simultaneous. The 
Bill would also prevent the possibility of fourteen federal elections 
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in twenty years and hence the number possible to 1981. Most speaL2rs 
believed that the electorate would favour this as they were both tired 
of elections and politicians. Furthermo:"e the practice in earlier times 
of prematurely dissolving the House of Representatives to keep elections 
contemporaneous would be discarded and the country would be rel-ieved 
of that period \<!hen, before a separate Senate election, government 
effectively ceases owing to electioneering. The removal of a fixed 
term for Senators would have the added effect of abolishing the 
anachronistic phenomenon of 11 1ame-duck" Senators. 
All arguments suggesting that a government would attempt to 
hold two quick elections to change the composition of the Senate \'lere 
dismissed out of hand as it was considered that in such an action any 
government 11 WOuld risk the loss of the whole of its power11 • 12 • Also 
--------------·--------------~-------~--~---
12. Q~C·it., p. 341. 
denigrated were the ide as of those who drew a n~ 1 ati 0nshi p between 
the present power of the Senate and separate Senate elections. 
One of the more important advantages that tht• Simultaneous 
Elections \'JOuld ensure was that half Senate elections did not adopt 
the character of a by-election and speakers from both si cbs of the 
House emphasised this point while others recognised the benefit that 
simultaneous elections would bring in eliminating the likelihood of 
independents being elected to Parliament. In addition the validity 
of the argument that the Bi 11 was a substantia 1 threat to democracy 
was seriously questioned when the House was consistently reminded that 
prior to 1960 every election, with the exception of one in 1953, had 
been held contemporaneously. 
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Senator t·1issen, like other Liberal speakers to the Bill, 
conceded that one short term benefit would accrue if the Bill was passed. 
This v1as that the Government would have an extended tenure of office 
in ~tJhich tc restore the economy before having to face the people again, 
but, on this point and others, the Labor Senators repudiated the 
arguments of their Libera 1 counterparts. 
The most significant point of departure between the two Parties 
was the anticipated effect of the Bill and in a statement constantly 
publicised by the 11 rebe1 11 Senator·s, Senator Button said: 11 0f course 
the real importance and significance of this proposal from our point 
of view in the Opposition is that it does what many of our critics 
say it will do. It limits the significance and influence of the 
Senate". 13· In reply to this and in face of the extensive quotes from 
1974 to the saw.e, the Liberal proponents were silent. 
'---,---~-----------,----------------
1 3. Op. Cit. , p. 261. 
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labor Senators, especially Senators Button and James McCelland, 
exploited the embarrassment caused by the dissention in the Liberal 
ranks and, along with constant attacks on Senator Withers, the courage 
of the 11 rebel" Liberal SE:nators was praised \vith monotonous regularity. 
The undeviating stand of the Labor Party in support of the Simultaneous 
Elections proposal was lauded amid much rhetoric on the virtues of 
consistency. The Govermrent was repeatedly harangued on their volte-
face and often quoted were statements made in 1974 by members of the 
then Opposition branding the Bill as a 11 fraud 11 and 11 an exercise in 
deception". The Labor Senators also accused the Government of 11 Smoke-
s creeni ng" and opportunism and to them the Gover1111ent was seen to be 
doing the right thing for the wrong reason: 11 By the wrong reason I of 
course mean political expediency dictated by the sorts of problems it 
has concerning the management of this country in 1977". 14• Mr. Whitlam 
in the House of Representatives had mentioned earlier another feature 
of the Bill of salience to the Labor Party. Harking back to the events 
of 1975 and the instructions that Libera 1 State Governments had purport-
edly given to their Governors, he commended that aspect of the Bill 
which took from the States the power to issue writs for Senate Elections. 
The debate on the Bill was opened for the "rebel 11 Senators by 
Senator Wright. ~1any facets of his arguments were later elaborated 
upon by other speakers but the Senator's principal objections to the 
Bill were that it was unnecessary, mis.leading and 11 radica11y weakens 
and undermines the poltJers of the Senate". 15 · In a srort reflection on 
the history of the Senate he reminded the House that the Founding 
Fathers had cons·idered that the Senate was the most significant part 
of the Federal st1Aucture, the Bill he therefore believed, would destroy 
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the ori gina 1 concepti o.1 of the Senate and reduce it to a mere "rubber 
stamp 11 of the House of Representatives. In support of these claims he 
quoted the opinions expressed by Odgers 16 • on the simila\A proposals of 
1974: 11 It was considered that the proposals would have undetmined the 
Federal structure and destroyed the independence of the Senate". 17 • 
Consistent with these arguments the Senator took strong objection to 
the so called 11 incidenta1" 18• part of the Bill as the issue of the writs 
for a Senate election he believed was one of the cardinal powers of a 
State in relation to a State's House in Federal Parliament. 
Senator Martin, speaking to the Bill likewise believed that 
it would involve a 11 Substantial and radical change in the nature of the 
Senate and in the distribution of political power in Australia". 19 • 
In one of the few penetrating speeches on the Bill sre considered many 
of its other ·implications such as its dangerous facility to side step 
the admittedly rather lengthy Double Di ssol uti on procedures which, in 
the long run, allowed the Senate to exercise a cool and reasoned 
judgement to the benefit of the country and Parliamentary democracy. 
Added to this our present system of government was based on a separat·i on 
of powers :1ebJeen the Executive and the legislature and, although the 
lines were often blurred, this Bill must be opposed because it gave 
all po\'ler to the Executive. 
16. J.R. Odgers, Australian Senate Practice, 5th Edition, Goverment 
P r~i nter·, Canberra, 1976. 
17. P.Ar..~ent_arv Oeba~~' Op.Cit~~ p.367 
18. Refer back to page 33. 
19. P.2d~entary Debates, Op.Ci_h_, p.400 
The present Constitution was regarded by Senators Martin and 
Rae as a constraint upon the possible tyranny of the majority and in 
the checks and balances that the Senate imposed upon the House of 
Representatives was protection for both Parliamentary Sovernment and 
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the States. This 1 atter theme was taken up by other Senators and in 
answer to critcisms that opposition to thE~ Bill was unfounded because 
the Senate was not ·in reality a State•s House, Senator Martin maintained 
that such accusations v,rere unjustified. The Senate she believed does 
represent the States, albeit through the party sys tern. Senator Walters 
elaborated on the inherent dangers of this Bill for Tasmania and in 
particular she shov,ted how in the House of Representatives the two 
large states of New South Wales and Victoria had a numerical superiority 
over the combined numbers of the smaller States. Hence as Tasmcnia's 
vote in that House was almost insignificant the Senate acted as t~ 
guardian for the interests of the small states. 
A feature of the Bi 11 that caused great contention amongst 
the dissidents was the Bill 1 s title of 'Simultaneous Elections' and 
Senator Rae claimed, like others, that the real import of the Bill was 
concerned \>Jith dissolution of the Senate rather than elections as such. 
Other·s seriously disputed that the Bill vwuld reduce the number of 
elections maintaining that its effects could very well be the opposite 
as a Prime Minister, flush vlith the euphoria of victory would be enabled 
to call two quick elections in an attempt to change t~ composition of 
the Senate. Furthermore as Senator Wright indicated the proposal would 
necessitate an e 1 ecti on for the Senate even in the ext ren-e case of when 
one had been precipitated only by internal party strife within the 
Lower House. In addition the Senators maintained that the Bill v1as 
deceptive and went to great lengths to quote earlier speeches denouncing 
the Bi 11 by members of the present Government. 
One of the great dangP-rs of the Bi 11, most believed, were the 
consequences to the country, and the States in particular, if it were 
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available to a Labor Government.. In support of these claims the avowed 
intentions of the Labor Party to limit the power and influence of the 
Senate were constantly iterated. Senator Wood however, reminded the 
House that the State•s themselves had been averse to any attempt to remove 
or denigrate the power of the Senate when a small group of dissidents 
opposed the Nexus referendum in 1967. A similar assault had taken 
place on the pm~Jers of the Senate in 1974 and had likewise been unsuccess-
ful. The same was expected in 1977 as he considered the people recog-
nised and respected the position and importance of the Senate. 
The Independent Senator, Senator Harradine, also opposed the 
Bill and in his speech quoted extensively from 1974 Hansari0· and press 
reports of both Government rnembers and L-NCP Premiers in a vitriolic 
attack on the Bill and upon all those who had changed their minds. How-
ever, the main arguments he presented had already been iterated by 
earlier speakers opposing the proposals. 
The debates on the other three Constitutional Alteration Bills 
were limited and in presenting the Senate Casual Vacancies Bill Senator 
Ourak indicated that its putpose was to ensure that a Senate vacancy 
would alv1ays be filled by a member of the same political party thus 
pteserving the people!s choice and the relative voting strengths of 
the parties from one election to the next. The other two Bills were 
regarded as just and valid reforms to the Constitution and aroused 
little contention in Parliament particularly so as the Government had 
guillotined the debates and hence only minimal opposition was recorded. 
20. Vo1.59, 1974. 
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Many features typical of referenda were highlighted in the 
debate on the Si rnultaneous Elections referendum. Of particular note 
was the stand taken by tre dissenting Senators which did not accurately 
reflect the degree of sup port behind them. Only a sma 11 group of 
thirteen or so Senators took on the combined forces of the Government 
and Opposition and hence, as Wildavsky maintained from a study of the 
1926 referendum, group sentiment may be a more reliable indicator of 
voting behaviour in referenda than political parties. 
~lhile in the previous section the Prime r~inister was shown 
to have needlessly antagonised his Senators, those n~st affronted 
were those who had a reported long standing disaffection for him. The 
referendum issue then may have just been a public for·um for the airing 
of these personal animosities and in this vein some nevvspaper articles 
did appear such as one of The Austra;ian entitled 11 11al's Enemies ~1ake 
a Stand 11 • 21. This i'Jent on to describe the political 'heavies' with 
strong personal following who were opposing the Prime t~1inister. The 
[\ge Editorial stated 11 the resistance and resentment provoked by the 
referendum proposals seems purely selfcentred 11 • 22 · ~Jhile these selfish 
motives may not be an over estimation of the situation, some Senators 
did appear to hold in addition valid and long standing reasons which 
supported their position. 
1m outstanding aspect of the debates in the Senate was that 
the Senators prime concern in opposing the Bill appeared to be because 
it posed a threat to the povJer and influence of their House vis a vis 
the House of Representatives. Only on the periphery of their 
21. T~_e Aust~a1J2.!l, Thursday, 24 February, 1977. 
Thursday, 24 February, 1977. 
speeches \'las a concern expressed for the States and Tasmania was 
mentioned rarely except in those speeches of the State's newest 
Senators. Again most of the 11 rebe1 11 Senators were known to be ardent 
bf'lievers in the role of the Senate as a House of Rev·iew and some were 
very senior Parliamentarians with a long history of opposition to 
attempts to denigrate the Senate's powers. ~1any Senators, such as 
Senators Wright and ~Jood, had opposed the referendum in 1967. 
As in most referenda the debates on the Bill involved in the 
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main a tedious repetition of its major imnediate aspects and very rarely 
any consideration of its long term constitutional and federal impli-
cations. Both the Labor Party and the 11 rebel 11 Liberals emphasised the 
questionable motives of the Government and its volte-face, and a feeling 
of suspicion v.1as engendered towards the Government and the Simultaneous 
E:lections Bill. This feeling vJas continually reinforced while the 
Government refused to meet or counter the accusations of hypocrisy and 
political opportunism directed at them. In the media hm.;ever, they 
were not ignored. 
CQt.1~1UNICATION OF THE PROPOSAL TO THE PUBLIC _ ... __ .....,. ___ .._......, __________ ,. __ _ 
One of the most interest·ing facets of the referendum proposals 
in the medil 3· v1as that \'lhile almost all the press, including nevJspapers 
in Tasmania, supported the proposals, the focus of the majority of their 
articles was on the revolt amongst the Liberal ranks and the questionable 
23. Because of the ephemeral nature of the electronic media most of this 
section has to rely upon newspaper reports \vhile in fact ~lr. Fraser 
and others d their campaigns primarily around TV and radio 
programn~:'.'!s and intervievJs, especially radio talk-back. Nev1spaper 
reports though must not be underest·imated as a moulder of publ·ic 
opinion. Unfo unately, the only TV transcripts obtainable were. 
those from opening of the 1 No' campaign and the A.B.C.'s 
11 Monday Con rence 11 • 
motives and implication~-; of the Government 1s S·imultaneous E'•ections 
and Seno.te Casual Vacancies Bills. The Ag~ welcomed the proposals as 
"Good Questions for the People 1124• while The Australian, The Examiner, 
--------
~.Courier-~ and The vJest Australian commented upon the widespread 
suppot~t the proposals had in Parliament and their reasonableness as 
reforms to the Constitution. All hoped that they would succeed but in 
view of the history of referenda were reticent about the outcome while 
The Australian succinctly said 11 in the May referendum there is some 
prospect of that rare agreement". 25 • 
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Despite this the media were instrumental in the defeat of the 
pl~oposals for their constant coverage in the States of the liberal Party 
divisions and the insincerity and opportunism of the Government. 
Although these aspects of the referendum were newsworthy little account 
seems t;., have been taken of the effect they created and Joan Ryden's 
11 When in doubt vote 1 No' may be the most effective slogan in a 
referendum1126 • must be recalled. This uncertainty was particularly 
potent in the small States where the Bill was sel"iously questioned by 
most Li beta 1 Senators and in some cases by the State Governments. 
Another interesting facet in the communication of the proposals 
to the public is that outside Parliament the argurrents against the 
Simultaneous Elections Bill altered their focus particularly as ~olling 
day neared. Whereas in the Senate opposition was based on the presumed 
threat to the power and influence of the Senate, in the media this was 
24. I~, Thursday, 17 February, 1977. 
25. The A_ us 1rt1 1 "L?I!.., Thursday, 17 February, 19 77. 
26. ~-~don_, Op. Cit., p.24. 
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transfonned into a grab for ~m.ver and a threat to the integrity of 
the States. One journalist w1iting on the Queensland campaign had this 
to say: 11 0n the r·eferenda issue, f~r. Bjelke-Petersen is trying to do 
to Mr. Fraser what he did to Mr. Whitlam in a wider political sense -
portray h~m as a dangerous centralist who \'las not to be trusted 11 • 27• 
In the last week of the campaign the proposals became almost 
totally lost in the propaganda and accusations and counter accusations 
made by the leading protagonists. The arguments in the media at this 
time concentrated upon the cost of elections with Senator Withers 
------~---·----- slating the 'No' campaign 
for wishing to waste $24 
••• - •• . • • • ••••• ' > - • ' - ••••• ~ •••••••••• ~ ............... ' ••••• 
.-------------
million on unnecessary 
elections. In reply Senator 
Rae considered this contE.:ntion 
specious and highly dangerous 
as it denigrates participa-
tory democracy, and ~~~~here 
the argument for changing 
the balance of po\'Jer beb·Jeen 
Parliament and the Executive 
is based on cost and con-
veni ence then the paucity 
of ttu~ real argument is demonstrated11 • 28· 
Other issues vthi ch arose v1ere the threats made by the Prime 
~1inister to hold an early election if the proposals were defeated and 
by Mr. \4hit1am to abandon any further attempts to change the Constitution. 
·-------------~-. --~-
16 May , 19 7 7. 
28. Thursday, 10 March, 1977. 
44. 
Senator Rae also became ove1~ zealous in his opposition to the proposal 
with '"No, no, a thousand times no, I'd rather die than say yes•? 
That•s about how I feel in \"elation to the major refer~ndum question. 1129 • 
L~hile in Parliament the Governrnent refused to be drawn on 
answering the questions raised by the proposal, the media read·ily 
ascribed reasons and d·iscussed all aspects of the issue. In the 
e1ectronic media Mr. Fraser attempted to allay some of this adverse 
criticism on the Government • s motives and constantly maintained 
that the Simultaneous Elections Bill was necessary because it removed 
from the Senate the ability to force the House of Representatives to 
an election while avoiding one itself. In support of this proposition 
he claimed that the Senate had only blocked the Supply Bills in 1975 
because, as Double Dissolution Bills were in hand, it would not have 
been immune ft'Om electoral judgement. In addition he believed th..:.t 
the influence of the Senate would be enhanced by the Bill because the 
Senate 11 Will be conscious of the results of its own actions and it 
will be more able to use the pmver available to it because it would 
know that half the Senate at least would go to the elections each time 
the House of Representatives does. 1130 • In attempting to justify the 
Government's volte-face ~~r. Fraser explained that circumstances had 
changed and that to have supported any of the proposals in 1974 would 
have confused the electors as the Opposition was then strongly opposed 
to some of the Bills. 
29. The_!lgg_, Friday, 6 ~iay, 19 77. 
30. The_~JE_, Monday, 21 February, 1977. 
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Most cr-itics believec; these to be rather· doubtful assertions 
by the Prime M·inister, but considered the proposal was of merit 
because: it may make the Senate more responsible, there \'Jas a possib-
ility of fewer elections, the rPduced cost to the country, the removal 
of the by-election character of half Senate elections, a Parliament 
that reflected the will of the people concurrently and less likeli-
hood ofinstability caused when each House was controlled by an opposing 
Party. 
The Senate Casual Vacancies proposal also came in for consider-
able criticism and cynicism as the Editorial in the [inan~~eview 
succinctly put it: 11 Merely by putting the proposal to the electorate 
the Government acknowledges that the constitutional devices it empowered 
to oust the previous Government were not entirely satisfactory. 1131. 
The other general criticisms of this Bill were concerned with the face 
that it gave political parties considerable power and enshrined them 
into the Constitution while in presenting this proposal the Government 
had gone beyond the guidelines as laid down by the Constitutional 
Convention. 
The Bill allowing votes for Territorians was regarded by all 
concerned as being just and fair, although there was considerable debate 
on this issue in the Northern Territory's newspapers and The Canberra 
Times which said: nit is an incredible comrnentary on the state of 
democracy in Australia today that the basic right to vote in referendums 
has to be fought for by the people of the Territories." 32 • 
31. Fin an_ci a l___fl~'-:'1 ev!_, Thursday, 1 7 February, 19 77. 
32. Tl:J~_nberr:a.Iimes_, Thursday, 14 March, 1977. 
In contrast to the Refer·endums proposal the Retiring Age 
for Federa·l Judges received considerable criticism and canment from 
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1 egal groups. The Committe1::! for an Independent High Court advocated a 
'No• vote while the Law Counci1 of Australia was divided on the issue 
but later in a public statement believed that such a proposition was 
not in the best interests of either their profession or the country. 
The former Prime f~inister Sir Robert Menzies in a rare intrusion into 
every-day politics said he opposed three proposals but particularly the 
Retiring Age for Federal Judges Bill as 11 it excites my particular 
hosti1ity". 33 · He considered it would be a calamity for Australia 
Sou..roe: The ---~··,"--· 
if written into the Constitution as had the 
proposal been introduced at Federation the High 
Court would 11 not have achieved the eminence it 
did in Judicial work". 34 • This was because a 
substantial proportion of this work occurred 
after many of its judges had turned seventy. 
Sir Robert's statements claimed the headlines 
for several days and most of the media considered 
that his comments added immense weight to the 
FPiday, 25 March., 19??. 'No' vote and lessened the Bill's chance 
of success. The Adelai f\dvertiser said 11 Now the referendum waters 
have been further muddied by the rather surprising intervention of Sir-
Robert Menzies 11 • 35 · In reply the Prinl:-: t~inister repeatedly claimed 
that Sir Robert had misunderstood the prC>posals and re-iterated that 
33. Th~~gg_, ~lednesday, 23 f~arch, 1977. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Jhe Ad~er::.1:ise!:_, t~onday, 24 April, 1977. 
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This occasion v.tas one of the few in the 1977 referenda when 
interest groups tonk an active part and after the publicity surrounding 
Sir Robert•s statements died the dissention amongst tre law groups 
quietened and they became insi~llificant in the campai9n. The only other 
groups to actively campaign were the Northern Territory legislative 
Council and the Legis 1 ati ve Assembly of the ACT on a 'Yes' vote for 
Territorians. A delegation from these bodies mounted an intense 
campaign on this proposal in Perth as they feared for its success as 
the Queensland Premier was advocating a 'No' vote and Sir Charles Court 
was not supporting 'it. Several spokesmen from this delegation came 
to Tasmania though their visits were brief and not well publicised. 
A number of "experts 11 and "intellectuals .. also added their 
weight to either case and particularly prevalent v>1ere the number of 
constitutional lavvyers v.;ho took a stand. Several advertisements Jdvoc-
ating a 'No' vote were placed in newspapers by the N.S.W. Constitutional 
League and a similar position was adopted by the Proportional Represent-
ation Society. Added to this the Clerk of the Senate Mr-. Odgers came 
in for considerable criticism from the N.S.W. Premier Mr. ~~ran for 
allegedly aiding and abetting thE:~ 'No' cc.se v1hile The National Times 
reported "Doctor No, Guardian of the Senate" and ~t1ent on to say "the 
intellectual and ideological rock on which the 'No' case is based is 
the sl·ight figure of James Rowland Odgers, 62.•• 36 • 
The official 11 for" and 11 against 11 cases were another factor 
which moulded pub 1 i c opinion and both the 11 Case for • Yes 111 and the "Case 
for 'No'" presented their basic arguments in an extremely simplified 
form. The 'Yes• case emphasised that the reforms were practical and 
sensible and had the support of both Parties while the 'No' case asked 
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a number of rhetorical questions unrelated to the referendum concerning 
government manipulation, the centralization of political powf'r and 
political principles. The 'No' case also included a very detailed out-
line of their arguments presented in a question and answer format which 
were designed by the Committee more to act as free notes for those 
interested persons who may wish to speak on the issue than for any other 
reason. In particular they concentrated upon the Simultaneous Elections 
proposal as the Committee had decided to fight only that proposal rather 
than by opposing them all to defeat none. Also it was only the Simult-
aneous Elections Bill that all 'rebel' Senators had found disagreeable. 
Throughout the 'No' case slogans such as 'No more power to 
Canber"'a 11 , 11 Don't be Deceived 11 , "Safeguard the Senate 11 , 11 Preserve Power 
for the People" and !!Your Right to Vote is Priceless" 37 • appeared while 
State Pm~l i arr~nts were reportedly faced vJi th a dangerous subversion of 
their po~r1ers if the referendum on Senate Cas ua 1 Vacancies was carried. 
In commenting upon the 'No' case The~~- said that the case emphasised 
the "tiresome inconsistency of the Government" 38• and was 11 Strong on 
misleading assertion and weak on relevant argument 11 • 39 • In conclusion 
the 'No' case cannot be exempt from accusations of nrisleading and 
highly emotive staternents which were designed to appeal to the people's 
fear of Canberra. When confronted by such allegations of propaganda-
mongedng the 'No• Campaign spokesman ITErely replied, "Isn't that what 
elections are a 11 about?" 
---------·-----·-------
37. Chief /\ustt"alian Electoral Officer, .~rendums, ~~ilke, Victoria, 
1977, pp.9-15. 
38. IlL~-1:.9~~-' Monday, 28 ~·larch, 1977. 
39. Ibid. 
Iri other features of the referendum the unusual sight of 
~1r. Fraser and Mr. ~~hitlam agreeing was counter productive and the 
electors were reported to be confused by the spectacle 11 0f the Prime 
f~hdster and the Leader of the Opposition, zipping around the country 
in a frenzied fortnight of campaigning 
- for a 'Yes' vote 11 • 40 · Similarlythe 
. '0 ['v9Jf_J __ ( ( vor;;.- communi cation with the pub l i c was not 
~. v/ C.7 i,·'c: ,_.'-
h. -~-n- It:.> generally successful and The Australian d[~~ t:,'6i":.: 
' I'!?) ~ p warned 11 The degree of general disinterest .fA~[)_cf/!/~ . is such that one suspects a large 
AR£3 P!30PL.t 51J"l-\(' /u~ff. 
.JU[J&&P PH 7l!f3 ': ' "' 
COMPNNY.il!:_'f N!!J~~-U proportion of people do not know now 
Source: Th!!_6.ae, 
Friday, 20 May, 19??. 
what the referendum questions are ••• 
there is likely to be a heavy apathy 
factor in the poll 11 • 41. 
From here attention must be turned back to the Liberal 
opposition towards the referenda. The rifts which occurred in Federal 
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Parliament, the cynicism expressed by the media towards the proposals 
and the campaign v•Jhi ch developed out of a 11 proportion to the issues 
were all only part of the hostility and dissention that became evident 
throughout the country. vJhen Parliament was prorogued at the end of 
February the focus of action created by the issues moved to the Liberal 
Parties in Queensland, vlestern Australia and Tasmania. 
-------------------
40. Ib_e:_..AListralian, Thursday, 28 April, 1977. 
41. 1977. 
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EV~NT_? IN QUEENSLAND AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
In Queensland and Western Australia the referendum proposals 
were the source of confus.ion for the L-NCP Government~; and party 
organisations and Federa'l and State members found themselves at odds 
with one another. The basic con ten ti on however surrounded the arguments 
for and against the Bills as a 1 ready adumbrated: those who accepted 
political reality and those 1t1ho adopted a state's right view and were 
fearful of the changes inherent in the Bills. 
On the first announcement of the referendum proposals opposition 
was expected from Queens 1 and as that State had raised objections to 
almost a 11 the recomrrendati ons of the Hobart Cons ti tuti onal Convention. 
The Acting Premier, Mr. Knox, on hearing of the proposed plans warned 
of political suicide and electoral backlash if the Commonwealth Govern-
ment \'Jent ahead with their referenda. In addition he argued that the 
expense of the referendum was not justified in view of the economic 
problems of the Government. 
On the return from overseas of the Premier, Mr. Bjelke-Petersen, 
the Prime ~1lnis r flev1 to Brisbane to discuss the proposals personally 
with him, while later on the Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the 
National Country Party, Mr. Anthony, had discussions with his State 
colleagues ther'e in an attempt to win their support. However, despite 
substantial rumours ·indicating a 'Yes' decision, on 22 March the State 
National Pal~1iamentary Party changed their minds at a meeting the day 
following the departure of t·1r. Anthony and voted unaminously to oppose 
all four referenda. This decision \vas a considerable rebuff for 
dd . h t • c . tt 42 • Mr. Anthony and at o s w1 t t,1e1 r ovm State r~anagement omm1 ee 
42. The organisational policy making body of the Queensland National 
Party. 
but in accord with some of their Federal member·s particularly the 
Senators who had earlier ind·i cated they were not going to campaign 
for a 'Yes' vote. 
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The position of the Queensland Liberal Party was one similarly 
characterised by confusion. Mr. Knox had come out strongly against 
the proposals on economic grounds and his stance was upheld by his 
Liberal colleagues in State Parliament, v1ho were prepared to 11 90 it 
alone 1143• and advocate a 'No' vote irrespective of the position taken 
by their National Party colleagues. In contrast to this the State 
Liberal Party organisation adopted a neutral position thereby accommod-
ating the diversity of opinions between the Federa 1 and State members. 
The referendum campaign in Queensland was as a result dominated 
by 'No' campaigners and vociferous attacks were made on the Bi 11s by 
the Premier, his NCP and Liber·al Party colleagues and sorre remnants of 
the DLP. The Prime N·inister's campaign developed into a slanderous 
match against the Premier as r~r. Fraser accused Mr. Bjelke-Petersen of 
"hitting at windmills" and riding an 11 anti-Canberra horse". 44 • Both 
sides resorted to quoting from secret political advisers to support their 
case. On a more ser·ious note the Federal Cabinet condemned the Queens-
land Government of wilful misuse of taxpayers money to support the 'No' 
campaign while in reply the $9 million spent by the Federal Government 
was justified because of the distinction betvJeen propaganda and that 
spent on staging referenda. 
43. Ihe Co l!d..~I-· t1~lj_l_, Thursday , 3 March , 19 77. 
44. The _ _l..9Q., \4ednesday, 18 May, 1977. 
Other t~inisters also entered the fr·ay with Mr. Robinson 
alleging that the Premier was intimidating some of his colleagues to 
support the 'No' case. Senator Martin accused the Government of 
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a "deliberate and calculated untruth" 45· and Senator Wood claimed Mr. Fraser 
had a hatred of the Senate and should be supporting the • No' case ·j n 
view of the fact that Mr. Whitlam had said the Simultaneous Elections 
proposal \'JOuld most benefit the Labor Party. 
In Western Australia a simi'lar pattern of confusion and division 
was evident where decisions and counter-decisions \'Jere made coupled 
with bitter wrangling within the Party. 
At the State Council r~eeting of the Liberal Party on tre 27 
February a minority of the delegates voted sixty to ten in support of 
the referenda after a speech by the sen~or West Australian Parliament-
arian, Senator vJithers. 46 · This meeting, unfortunately, was not 
attended by the ~~estern Australian Premier, Sir Charles Court, who 
1 ater declared he was not bound by the Councn•s decision. In subsequent 
events the Premier made it clear his Government would not be displeased 
45. Ibid. 
46. During the morning session of the State Council meeting four 
notices of motion had been put proposing th the Council oppose 
the referenda. f'tlany councillors had then left believing that 
the vote vJOul d not take p 1 ace unti 1 ti1e next meeting. In the 
latter part of the afternoon, however, Senator Withers in a 
fiery speech to de legates present, and supported by speeches of 
Senators Durak and Chaney, had persuaded Counci 1 to over-
whelminCJlv suooort the camoaiqn. Senator Sirn. alonq \vith the 
Premier·-and others who opposed the Bi 11, were- not at the meeting. 
Immediately after the motion of support \lias passed, however, a 
notice of motion to r-esc.ind it ~tJas given. This in effect left 
the Council without a position on the proposals until it was 
brought up again at the next Council meeting. The resc-ission 
motion incurt~ed the wrath of SenatOlA l1lithers 111ho branded it as 
"1udicrous 11 and asan attempt to stab Federal members in the 
back. The t ralian t·1onday, 28 February, 1977. 
if all proposals were lost and released the text of a letter he had 
written to the Prime ~1inister outlining his objections to the current 
Bills. He consider-ed this letter had not been adequately answered by 
the Prime Minister and just prior to a press conference of the Prime 
l~inister•s in Perth, the Premier let it be known that the L-NCP State 
Parliamentarians had decided to oppose two referenda - Simultaneous 
Elections and Senate Casual Vacancie~ and not actively support the 
other t~vo. 
t!Jeanwhile in the Liberal Organisation a substantial challenge 
had ar·i sen over the earlier decision of State Council to sup port the 
referenda and at their meeting at the end of April the Council decided 
to reverse their ear·lier decision, further confusing the issue, and 
oppose three of the proposals but not actively campaign against them. 
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To further add to the disarray the NCP in vJestern Australia 
urged 1 No' votes to the Simultaneous Elections and Senate Casual 
Vacancies pt'oposals though declined to give reasons for doing so to 
allow itself room for manoeuver. It did however ask its Federal Leader, 
Mr. Anthony, to stay away else it would be forced to campaign against 
him. Mr. Anthony cancelled his \~estern Jl.ustralian campaign. 
Those Liberals in support of the proposals along with some 
'luke-vJarm• ALP members were in such few numbers and as well divided 
that there were not enough members to form a • Yes' committee in the 
State, and MP's had to campaign ind'ividually. The Prime Minister•s 
campaign there also ran into trouble and Mr. Fraser was castigated by 
Sir Charles Court for failing to have had consultations with the States 
and later accused him of 11 gutter tactics 11 to promote the referenda. 
As May 21 approached each side claimed increasing support 
amongst their electorates while most ne\'!Spapers ran editorials 
explaining each of the proposals. In conclusion The Age said 11The 
referendum in Queensland and Hestern Australia is inevitc:bly being 
seen as a trial of strength bet\'Jeen the Fraser-tmthony coalition and 
the conservative State governments". 47• 
Source: '!J:ze National '!''imes~ May 23-28, 197?. 
Typical of referenda, as suggested by Wildavsky, tre 1977 
referenda exacerbated and highlighted the stt~ess and strains in the 
Liberal Party both betvJeen and across Federal lines. The considerable 
publicity which followed these conflicting decisions, the weight of 
the State Gover·nments, the propaganda, and the personalities campaign-
ing against the proposals, all contributed to the defeat of the 
47. The ~gg_, Friday, 20 t~ay, 1977. 
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Simultaneous Elect·ions Bill. In the other States such as N\~w South 
Wales there was some opposition to the Bill but this was relatively 
restrained '.'Jhile Victoria and South Australia v1ere the only States 
where, except for a few -individuals, all Liberal Party FE!deral and 
State bodies were in substantial agreement. All, however, bitterly 
complained that Mr. Fraser had failed to consult them. 
The situation in Tasmania was similar to that in Queensland 
and \-/estern Australia the major difference being that the State Labor 
Government was in favour of the proposal and hence the dissention 
surrounded the Liberal Opposit·ion. This situation will now be 
examined in more detail. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE REFERENDUM CONTROVERSY IN TASt·IJ~NIA 
Two of the more important questions that stand out when 
considering the referendum in Tasmania is why and how did the Liberals 
divide so seriously and \vhat factors determined Tasmania • s overwhe 1 mi ng 
l 
rejection of the Simultaneous Elections proposal? 
This chapter then wi 11 penetrate behind the liberal Party in 
the State and attempt to illuminate the rifts that developed on State, 
Federal and Organisational levels, and the resultant inter and intra-
group alliances. As Wildavsky maintained, the end result is a strange 
collection of 1bedfe1low'. 
Also examined in the chapter will be the 'Yes' and 'No' 
campaigns and the emotionalism and propaganda generated in their support. 
Possible influences on Tasmanian voters will also be considered and as 
a noteworthy corrrnent on the campaign The t~ercur,y said, 11 Referendums 
are supposed to be of the people for the people. Unfortunately, the 
referendums on May 21 w-ill be very much by politicians for politicians".!. 
On the revolt of the five Liberal Senators against the Govern-
ment's proposed referenda Bills the State Libet·al Party was in an 
a\vkward position as its mvn ii:.E!mbers were at serious odds with the 
Fedet~al Party. \~ithin the Party Organisation a strong move developed 
to support their stand essentially because of the cons i det·ab le pub 1 i city 
they had received in Tasmania and elsewhere. An emergency meeting of 
1. Jhe Mer~~~' Tuesday, 29 March, 1977. 
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State Council vHl.S called at Campbell Tovm on 27th February and to this 
Mr. Fraser sent the Attorney General, Mr. Ellicott, as his personal 
envoy in an attempt to 11 try to quell the •referendum rebellion' 11 • 2· 
At the meeting the Attorney General was joined by the Minister for 
Environment, Housing and Community Development, Mr. Newman in present-
ing the 'Yes• case to the Executive while Senators Wright and Rae 
presented the • No • case. 
In addition to the arguments outlined in Parliament it is 
believed that the 'Yes' proponents relied heavily t~pon the State Party's 
duty to support the Federal Party and particularly the Prime Minister, 
while other aspects of their case queried the Senate•s real validity 
for Tasmania as in the majority of instances it votes along party lines. 
In reply the 'No• case was of the opinion that the Senate is of funda-
mental importance to Tasmania and the other small states and it ic; only 
in the House of Representatives and the Executive where, owing to the 
superiority of members from Victoria and N.S.\.J., the Senate is not 
regarded in this manner. Furthermore the 'No' proponents argued that 
there was no demonstrable reason for change while the complete about 
face vmuld force the Liberal Government into a massive credibility 
crisis in the electorate. Senator Rae also argued that support for the 
referendum on Simultaneous Elections was not in accord with Liberal 
policy as had been clearly enunciated on five occasions from 1973 to 
1975. 
In an effort to accon1modate the differing .. nn"t Y\"11"\Y'IC"' V}-'liiiVII.:> hr\"l·h .,,; +hi n UV""II f'l 1 "II lit 
the Party and the Organisation, (though it was reported very few members 
of the Executive supported the •ves' case,) the Executive adopted a 
neutral position on all of the referenda. The provision of their stand 
2. }he E~E~i~~~' Saturday, 26 February, 1977. 
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did however accord recognition to, 11 the special position of the Senate 
in relation to the smaller States 11 ,3· hence supporting the Senators. 
At the same time they al1ov1ed that 11 each individual should be free to 
make its (sic) mm decisions and that all members- buth Parliamentary 
and organisational - be free to act and vote as they see fit 11 • 4• The 
Executive thus disassociated itself from the political turmoil and 
allowed the Tasmanian Liberals to take an individual stand without 
committing the Party to a line that was in direct opposition to that 
taken by the Party in other. States. Their failure to support the 
referenda hovJever was, in electoral terms, tantamount to rejecting it. 
The decision of the Executive was a rebuff for Mr. Fraser and 
the 'Yes' proponent~ and indicated the Organisation's pique at not being 
consulted over the issue as \vell as setting a precedent for the positions 
taken by other Liberal bodies elsev1here. The media, however, took the 
Party to task over their compromise calling it "brav.Jling 11 , "quick 
political footwork 11 , 5• 11 internecine wrangling" 6• and for 11 having to 
fall back on the convenient excuse that party philosophy provides free-
dom of choice to disguise the fact that members are so divided on the 
issue 11 • 7• 
Over the months to polling day and in the heat of the campaign 
the Executive's decision was the source of much speculation on the 
internal affairs of the Liberal Party. Aspects most often mentioned 
3. The Hercury, Monday. 28 February, 1977. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ib.£. ~,1e~Cll!)'_, Tuesday, 1 t~arch, 1977. 
7. Ibid. 
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¥Jere the unpopularity of Mr. Fraser amongst State Liberals and the ; 11-
feeling which had developed between the Prime Minister and Senator Rae 
over that latter being bypassed for a Cabinet position in 1975. The 
State Party had also had 11 Something of a love affai r 11 with the fornx::r 
leader of the Liberals ~1r. Snedden, while others saw the decision as a 
victory for the ruling party triumvirate: Senator Rae, Mr. Bingham, 
and the State Party President, Mr. vJing. 
Contrary to the latter claim the decision could in no way have 
been seen as a victory for ~1r. Bingham \1/ho, as Leader of the State 
Parlianx::ntary Liberal Party (PLP), was now in the unenviable position 
of being at variance with the State Organisation. The PLP had report-
edly made a decision to support the referenda both prior to the 
opposition of the Senators and the State Executive•s decision. This 
had ber1 taken on a general consensus of the members and with a 
minimum of debate while it was also rumoured that members had not even 
seen a copy of the Bills. 
At a meeting on the 2nd March a subsequent decision on the 
PLP's position was deferred in an effort to escape their dilemma and 
diffuse the issue. The reason given for this was because members were 
both apprehensive about the divis·ive effect on the State in view of the 
Executive's decision and anxious about getting into a position of 
opposition ~tli th the Fe ra 1 Government. In the press Mr. f3i ngham 
claimed at great length that the deferral was not a back down and main~ 
ta·ined that reports of their earlier decision to support the proposals 
were 11 fabri cated 11 • He said 11 We have not and never did form a view" 8• 
and that rather the State MP's had only supported the idea of four 
reft~renda be·ing put to the people, but had 11 Specifically avoided 
60. 
forming any attHude" 9 · towards the propos a 1 s. 
In State Parli arrent Mr. Bingham's statements were the source 
of considerable questioning from Labor backbenchers wr~o attempted to 
exploit the Leader's ernbarrass1ng predicament. In re~ly Mr. Bin1Jam 
refused to be drawn on the ·issue and at the end of the Parliamentary 
sitting the State Government gave notice of motion to debate the issue 
i r. the House. This action by the Labor Party brought pressure on the 
PlP and forced them to take a stand. Had this not occurred it was 
indicated the matter would have rested and members be allowed a 
conscience vote. The majority however, were expected to have opposed 
the proposals regardless. 
On the 18th ~1arch, almost three weeks after the Executive's 
decision, the Parliamentary Party ended speculation and vacillation, 
reversed their earlier decision, and advocated a 'No• vote to the 
Simultaneous Elections referendum. ~~t~. Bingham branded the Bill as 
misleading as he considered it should be described as a Senate dissolu-
tion proposal and in any event was an 11 Unjustified attack upon the 
Commonwealth Upper House in the guise of convenience to voters 11 • 10 • 
The Liberal decision, he claimed, was based solely on the criterion o-7 
11 VJhat was best for Tasmania" 11 · and, as this proposal tended to weaken 
the Senate, it was contrary to the interests of the State. Mr. Bingham 
was ernph ati c that the PLP • s decision rested on the fact that it 
k'egarded the referendum as purely a State matter. 
9. Jh~~~-~~.!EL!:!~_c_, Wednesday, 2 ~larch, 19 77. 
10. The Her~~r:y_, Saturday, 19 ~·1arch, 1977. 
11. Ibid. 
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In supporting the other three proposals t"lr. Bingham emphasised 
the PLP's belief in the Constitution Convention as a worthwhile project 
11 that should be supported as the only way likely of achieving meaning-
ft!l amendments to the Federal Constitution 11 • 12 • He considered that the 
proposals should be put to the people for them to decide and as well 
outlined the State Party's longstanding support for it as a viable 
means for non-partisan discussion of constitutional reforms. 
Despite the stand taken by the PLP very few State Parliament-
arians took an active part in the campaign but rather preferred to 
leave the whole issue with Mr. Bingham. But, while the decision of the 
State Executive had allowed all politicians and organisational members 
to take an individual stand, the PLP's decision had over-ridden this 
liberty. On the 19th t~ay, however, Mr. Baker, a delegate to the 
Constitutional Convention, broke the facade of their unity and declared 
;> 
himself in support of the Simultaneous Elections proposal while in the 
press Mr. t~lather was a 1 so rumoured to sup port the • Yes • case. 
The State Executive's decision gave freedom to the Federal 
Senators and MHR's many of whom took singular positions~ complicated 
the Pat·ty's position and confused the electorate with their claims and 
counter claims made in support or opposition to the proposals. In a 
State where politics is personalised and personalities play a significant 
part these individuals had considerable Height. Those leading the 'No' 
case were S2nators Rae and ~Jri ght - both with considerable prestige 
and strong personal followings throughout the State \·lhile Senator Wright 
is particularly renowned as a constitutional lawyer. On the opposing side 
12. E.M. Bingham, Q.C., M.H.A., (The Han.), leader of the Tasmanian 
ParliamE!ntary L-iberal Party, 11 For Tasmania 1 s Sake- Don't Weaken 
the Senate 11 , Press Re 1 ease, 19 77. 
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were two of the States most vocal f1HR's, the States only Federal 
Minister, l~r. Newman of Launceston, and the outspoken member· for 
Denison Mr. Michael Hodgman. 
From the time the conflict over the Simultaneous Electims 
pr·oposal first arose Senator Rae repeatedly appeared in the Tasmanian 
press refuting claims made by his Federal colleagues and repelling 
attacks of the State Labor Party. In doing so he constantly advertised 
the 'No' case and branded the Simultaneous Elections proposal as 
deceptive because it gave power to the Prime Minister and 11 takes away 
the protection which the Senate gives to the States 11 • 13· 
His other Senate colleagues supported his stand at intervals 
over the months. Senator Wright declared the proposal dangerous and 
Senator Walters tried dubiously to reconcile the Parties' stand vJhile 
still rejecting the proposal: "The Liberals did not intend to abuse 
the pr·oposed change in the Constitution but the Labor Party recognised 
the use of vvhich this power could be put -weakening and finally 
abolishing the Senate 11 • 14• 
Mr. Michael Hodgman, on the pet~sonal request of the Prirre 
Minister, was appointed the Tasmanian chairman of the Committe to 
Coordinate the 'Yes' Campaign. This decision was announced by 
Mr. Ne\vman, who was ostensibly involved with heavy t·1inisteria1 duties 
but who privately expressed some misgivings about the proposals. 
~1r. Newman took very little part in the campaign but in The Examiner 
13. The Examiner·, ~Jednesday, 27 April, 1977. 
he strongly advocated a 'Yes • vote to all and said he "Found it 
difficult to accept the view that the referendum would in any way 
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diminish the role of the small states such as Tasman1·an. 15 • M H d r. o gm.:m 
in leading the • Yes' case said he was concerned for ration a 1 reforms 
to the Constitution and maintained that the proposals were for justice, 
reason and common sense while expecting the proposals to be carried 
by the support of the silent majority. He also reiterated many of 
those reasons heard in Parliament in support of the 'Yes' case. 
Lack of even basic consensus was evident amongst almost all of 
Tasmania's other Federal politicians and each took a very individual 
stand. Despite the fact that all had voted for the proposals in 
Parliament many showed considerable misgivings particularly as polling 
day neared. The member for Braddon t·1r. Groom, advocated a • Yes • vote 
but did not carnpai gn and for the most part remained aloof from the frcw 
while the member for Franklin, Mr. Goodluck, stayed uncommitted. In 
contrast ~lr. Burr, the member for \Hlmot, came in for considerable 
attention over his stand and first maintained he was neutral on all 
issues. However, under the supposed pressure from his electorate to 
divulge his personal opinions, he declared that he would be voting 'No• 
to the Simultaneous Elections and Senate Casual Vacancies referenda 
but in doing so, it was reported, "considerable pressure had been put 
on him not to make his feeling public". 16 • Senatm~ Archer, the only 
Tasmanian Liberal Senator not to defiantly oppose the proposals, 
maintained a neutral position on the issue but did state that "any move 
which tended to lessen the authority of the Senate could only dis advantage 
the smallest, and smaller States 11 • 17 · 
15. Advocate Tuesday, 1 March, 1977. 
16. Th~ E~9:~~~-' Thursday, 12 t~ay, 19 77. 
17. l:b£Jj£I£.~rt_, Tuesday, 26 March, 19 77. 
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Most of the Tasmanian politicians then were in some way either 
not enthusiastic about or rejected the proposals and such uncertainty 
clearly transmitted to the electorate a very unfavourable impression 
of the referendum. This was re-inforced almost daily hy constant 
reminders that the Simultaneous Elections Bill was a threat to the 
State's power and influence as it attempted to weaken the Senate. 
In combination with the politicians• approach to the proposals 
the Liberal Organisation was also confused and apathetic and, despite 
the Executive's decision, branches, with the exception of several in 
Hobart, adopted a negative stance to either or both the Simultaneous 
Elections and the Senate Casual Vacancies proposals. In addition the 
vlomen's Group and the Council of the Young Liberals came out in support 
of the 'No' case, the latter only after extensive presentation of the 
two positionsby Senators Wright and Mr. Hodgman. They believed it was 
not necessary to write the proposed reforms into the Cons tit uti on. 
ThG most contentious aspect that developed from the Organis-
ation's stand vms the pub 1 i c announcement on the 19th May by the Party 
President, Mr. Wing, that if the Simultaneous Elections Bill was passed 
11 the po~tter of the Senate \1/i 11 be weakened. Consequently it is Tasmania 
that will suffer. 1118• But, while he considered that the resolution of 
the State Executive to allow members of the Organisation 11 to be free 
to act and vote as they see fit" 19 • applied to him, some sections of 
the Party v-1ere of the contrary opinion. In this vein the Launceston 
E~e:r.headlined that Mr. l~ing's stand was in breach of the agreenent 
with the Executive and would bring out some ill-feeling in the Party 
to'tJards his 1eadersh·ip. Such reports Mr. Wing claimed were totally 
fabricated and mis·informed as he had previously cleared his statement 
-·---------
18. The tlerE_l!_~, Thursday, 19 f~ay, 1977. 
19. f,1onday, 28 February, 1977. 
uith the State Executive and hence the pub 1 i city was unwarranted and 
OJt of all proportion to the issue involved. At the follo~tling meeting 
the State Executive passed a unanimous vote of confidence in his 
leadership and the stand he had taken. Generally however, the Party 
Organisation remained uninvolved through out the campaign though a few 
ardent rank and file menbers did volunteer to man the polling booths 
and distribute campaign literature. 
THE LABOR STAND AND EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN 
-----· __ ,..;:_;;_.;...___~_::.;_,.:...;.;...;...;.:.:..:.:;_:_ 
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~lhile the Liberal Party were in a quandary and their rifts 
constantly in the public eye, the Labor Party gave immediate and 
unequivocal support for all four referenda, particularly the Simultaneous 
Elections proposal. As early as 2nd March the Premier had come out 
strongly in their favour and his actions were later backed by the 
unanimous decision of the Administrative Committee20 • of the Party. 
The Simultaneous Elections referendum they believed did not comprise 
a threat to either the State or Tasmania but rather related to a slight 
but important reform to the Australian Constitution. 
The united front presented by both the Federal Labor Senators 
and the State Labor Party belied the·ir minimal participation in the 
r·eferenda campaign. This was due to both a lack of money and the 
diversion of ~tJhat money they had in an attempt to capture Legislative 
Council seats for· the Party whose election \'las to be held on the 
Saturday fo 11ovving referendum po 11 i ng day. The Party did however, 
make a concerted effort to exploit the liberal Party•s divisions and 
a few Ministers and backbenchers in Parli arnent were engaged in a 
20. The Adrn·inistrative Con1nittee of the Labor Party is a key policy 
making body. 
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repeated onslaught on r~r. Bingham over the Liberal positior. 
Mr. Lohrey, a member of the Tasmanian Ct:mstitutional delegation, 
made a vitrolic attack c·n the Liberals stand believing it was based on 
childishness and malice for Mr. Fraser while in r-eply Mr. Bir.gham retort-
ed that such statements had shown up Labor's real motive for its stand. 
This \!las to abolish the Senate at the first convenient opportunity and 
indicated that 11 the State Government is putting the Federal ALP's 
political motives ahead of the interests of Tasmania". 21. On several 
occasions the Minister for Education Mr. Batt harangued the Liberals 
and accused the 'No' case of being put by 11 ei ther reactionaries or those 
\'lith an axe to grind". 22 • Two days before polling day he took Mr. Bingham 
to task for supposedly silencing several of his Parliamentary colleagues 
reported to be in support of the proposals. His tactics worked and in 
reply Mr. 8aker broke with the PLP and indicated his .support for the 
'Yes• case. 
The most active and continuous proponent of the proposals in 
the Labor Party was the Premier, t~r. Nielson. On numerous occasions he 
repeatedly admonished the State that: 11 if we are not prepared to accept 
reasonable and moderate changes to our Constitution through the ballot 
box, we could be opening the door to extremists who could argue that 
change cannot be achieved without unrest 11 • 23• Amendments were there-
fore neces~,ary to update the Cons tit uti on and, as these proposals were 
moderate and sensible, they would enhance and strengthen the Constitution. 
The Senate election procedures he regarded as ridiculous and the 
21. The !~erc::..u.ry, Tuesday, 22 March, 1977. 
22. Th~-_!~~!:f~!rx_, Wednesday, 6 April, 1977. 
23. IQ~er_~~~' Friday, 29 April, 1977. 
slogan "Don't Complicate the Constitution" was a mindless approach to 
serious questions of Constitutional reform. In addition he believed 
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that the Constitutional Convention should be supported and that the 
shallowness of the Liberals was revealed in their support for the 
resolutions at the Hobart Convention but their opposition to them on the 
hustings. When the real crunch came they had opted for the status quo. 
In events prior to this an attempt had been made by some members 
of the Tasmanian Constitutional delegation to adopt a united front in 
support of the proposals. However, due to the delegations partisan 
composition, thi.s was impossible and instead they issued a statement 
' . . ..... 
. ~!· ., . 
which, although implying suppmAt for the principle of the referendum 
and drawing attention to the Conv~ntion's decision, did not specifically 
mantion the current proposals. In this vein, and to embarrass the State 
Liberal PLP even further, the Government sought to bring the matter 
before State Parliament. A motion was subsequently passed by the House 
whi ctl supported their reso 1 uti on and urged Tasmanian electors 11 To 
support the Referendum proposa1 .•• by voting 'Yes' to all four". 24• 
The Independent, Senator Harradi ne from Tasmania, bolsterec1 
the 'No' campaign with his stt'ong advocacy of the 'No' vote to both 
the Simultaneous Elections and the Senate Casual Vacancies proposals. 
In Federal Parliament the Senator had voted against the Government on 
the Bills and had said to the press 11 I do not see anything in it for 
Tasmania which being the small State, looks to the Senate for 
protecti on 11 • 25 • Furthet'more the Senate Casual Vacancies Bi 11 had nothing 
to say about independent Senators like himself. In the intervening 
______ , __ , _______________ , 
24. House of Assembly, Notices_~ior:L_,and Orders of the Day, 
Session of 1977. 
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months to the campaign the Senator was little involved in the controversy 
except for several Y'adio programmes, the 'No' campaign television 
programme and a long article in The Advocate on the evP of the election. 
The Senator said then that "definitely the safest thin~J is to vote 
'No'" 26 • and also considered the referenda a waste of time and taxpayers 
money. The successful passage of the pmposals he claimed would only 
allow for a harsh budget to be brought down later in 1977. 
Despite the ·internal wrangling of the Liberal Party and the 
Labor Party's aggravation of the contention, the Tasmanian electors were 
fleetingly informed over the months of the controversy that the referenda 
caused in other States. The affairs in Queensland and Western Australia 
were covered briefly but with little depth and served mainly to emphasise 
Tasmania's crucial position for the success or otherwise of the 
Simultaneous Elections proposal. The statements made by Sir Rober.; 
Menzies made the headlines for several days and the opinions of other 
experts and intellectuals, past politicians and members of the Legislative 
Council were mentioned in passing. 
On the publication of the for and against cases some comment 
was recorded in the press but generally this was only to reiterate the 
arguments already heard. They did however, provide a fruitful subject 
for many 11 Letters to the Editor". 
This column in the State's three newspapers was a ccn&:ant 
source of interest over the months. On several occasions the State 
and Federal politicians used it as a means to praise the validity of 
their arguments and accuse the other side of polemics and sophistry 
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and in this manm~r letters of Senators \~ithers, Walters and Wright were 
published. From the general public many letters outlining their dangers 
or praising their vil~tues were printed. The referendum was variously 
described as a 11 Fascist Plot 1127 • and the 'No' case as a "monument to 
irrationality and perverse logic 11 , 28• while another writer implored 
Tasmanians to rid themselves of old inhibitions once and for all and 
give "a big 'Yes' to change 11 • 29 • 
As in most referendum campaigns public opinion po11s 30 • have 
attempted to gauge the mood of the electorate. The first polls were 
conducted over two weekends in March and clearly indicated a big 
majority in favour of all the proposed changes with the Simultaneous 
Elections proposal registering at 73%. Polls taken in April still 
showed a high proportion of those questioned in favour of the reforms 
with the Simultaneous Elections proposal remaining at the same level 
but, by the 20th May, these figures had dropped. Had the Simultaneous 
Elections proposal been held on the 14th May it was estimated it would 
have had a 75% and more chance of being accepted as a 66% nationwide 
response was recorded. In Tasmania though this support was only 
registered at 55%. The pollsters qualified their findings with a 
number of va.riables and believed that final result could be even lower, 
and in the end were not too wide of their national estimate. What 
they appeared to have forgotten however. was that for a referendum 
to be carried a majority of states as we 11 as a majority of people 
must accept the proposals. 
27. The ~~~-c~.r.y., Tuesday, 15 ~larch, 1977. 
28. TheM?~~~!~' Monday, 25 April, 1977. 
29. Ihu~gx_c:~~' Tuesday, 17 ~lay, 1977. 
30. See Tt}~:.. ______ r:~ury, Tuesday 28 t·1arch, Wednesday 20 April and 
Saturday 20 ~1ay, 1977. 
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In general, while the referenda controversy ranged widely, 
the people of Tasmania were primarily concerned with what was happening 
in their own State. As polling day neared the bitterness in the Liberal 
Pa~~ty and the emotionalism and propaganda of the campaigns intensified 
and the Tasmanian voters became the pawns of the inter and intra Party 
warfare. 
THE OFFICIAL CAMPAIGN 
The 'Yes' and 'No' campaigns were conducted across the nation 
but Tasmania, as Queensland and Western Australia where the proposals 
were also threatened, became the focus of the nation's attention. The 
'Yes' case had the more difficult task to try and convince the State to 
accept change while the 'No' case, in listing the dangers the 
Simultaneous Elections proposal pose..:: to the State, simply appealed to 
the status quo. 
Ear·ly in the campaign both protagonists attempted to explain 
their case in some sort of way and most newspapers ran articles detail-
ing the 'Yes' and 'No' cases. As polling day neared though rationality 
progressively disappeared only to be replaced by emotionalism, propa-
ganda and wild and misleading accusations. 
With the resources of the Federal Government and the Liberal 
Secretariate behind it the 'Yes' campaign had unlimited funds in 
comparison to their opposition. The latter, however, had got av1ay to 
a leading start and this impetus had been maintained by the squabbles 
in the State Liberal Party and the easy access that the rebel Senators 
had to the media. Such access was out of all proportion to their 
numerical strength and through this means the 'No' campaign lt'Jas given 
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an estimated quarter million dollar campaign at absolute minimal cost. 
The 'Yes' case also had the support and influence of the Prh1e Minister 
and Leader of the Opposition to bolster their cause and right up to 
polling day believed erroneously that they had won Tasmania's vote. 
Their optimism however, was never shared by their opponents. 
In Tasmania the campaign was conducted on a number of levels 
with the Federa 1 'Yes' and • No' campaigners continuing their bitter 
wrangling in the State and competing for media attent·i on with the State 
liberal and Labor politicians. The great advantage that the 'No' case 
had over their opponents was that, with the State Labor Party relatively 
content to sit back and watch, the 'Yes' case was dominated by Federal 
politicians. At the best of times these people were never very popular 
in the State and were even less so when they attempted to woo Tasmanian's 
votes with slanderous accusations against the State's own politicians. 
Furthermore the referenda had followed hard on the footsteps of the 
Apple and Pear Indus try 31. controversy in which the Federa 1 po 1 iti ci ans 
had been denounced for their neglect of Tasmania in contrast to the 
local politicians who had been lauded for their stand in the interests 
of the State. 
31. The referenda campaign, unfortunately for the Federal Governll".ent, 
had fol1mved this ·issue where ~1esst'S, Goodluck, Burr and others 
from Tasmania had attempted to oppose the Government's proposed 
measures. They had t~eportedly had several heated exchanges with 
the Prime t~inister over the issue and during one such occasion 
Mr. Fraser \Vas repo d to have called ~1r4 Goodluck a 11 grub 11 .. 
This was given ~tlide pub1·icity in the Tasmanian press and the 
politicians ~IJere lauded for their valiant attempt to buck the 
Party and fight for Tasmania. i''1ore importantly for the referenda 
campaign the Federal Government was unpopular as the issue had 
served to accentuate Tasmania's insignificance in the Commonwealth 
and heighten the anti-Canberra feeling. 
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Centra 1 to the • No' campaign vms a fear that the referendum 
might pass through apathy and ignorance and the principle thrust there-
fore was to attract the pub1ic 1 S attent·ian firstly to the referendum 
and secondly to the Simultaneou<; Elections proposal that many took 
objection to. But, the campaign in Tasmania was substantially different 
from that in the other States because of the failure of the Committee 
t t b 1 . h F d 1 d . t . t . t 32 · o es a 1s a e era co-or 1na 1ng secre ·ar1a e. In addition to 
this drawback members of the Committee had planned to present their 
case to the nation but the nati anal ai rstrike stranded them and sent 
their schedules awry. The strike coincided with almost a week of the 
campaign - seriously overshadov-Jing it as well as stranding Senator Rae 
out of Tasman i a. 
In fv1elbourne on lOth May ~k. Fraser opened the 'Yes• campaign 
declaring that the pr·oposals vvere "Fair, just and reasonab1e 1133 · -"nd 
asked, in addition to those arguments he presented at the time of the 
Parliamentary crisis, if the nation was capable of allowing basic reforms 
to the Constitution. Throughout the campaign he deviated little from 
these precepts. Furtt1ermore he refused to answer any of the criticisms 
raised by his opponents and amongst other threats considered that should 
the proposals be defeated it would be bad for Parliamentary government 
in Australia. In Tasmania his basic contentious ranged a little wider 
and in between bitter reproaches on the rebel Senators he maintained 
that the referendum wou1 d protect the smaller States. As well, with 
simultaneous elect·ions no government could afford to forget these 
States as each had an equal nunt)er of Senators in the Upper House. 
-------- ··------·-------
32. All moves in this direction were reportedly 11 thv.Jarted by people in 
high p 1 aces". 
33. I!l§ .. Ji?J:CUrY., Tuesday, 10 t~ay, 1977. 
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The 'Yes' campaign in Tasmania was co-ordinated by Mr. Hodgman 
and Mr. Fraser made two visits the first of which coincided with the 
airstrike. The Prime Minister's handling of this issue bo-lstered the 
'Yes' case considerably and improved his image in the State as he offer-
ed to bring the RAAF Hercules aircraft to the rescue. Mr. Fraser was 
hosted at a dinner given by the Party in Launceston where he exhorted 
the Bass electorate to again show the way, 34 · and from there went to 
Hobart to another dinner in tl"is honour. 35 • He spoke on a number of 
cor11nercial radio-talkback programmes, had several television interviev1s 
and was guest in a half hour interview vii th the ABC's "This Day Toni ght 11 • 
A panel of the State's leading political journalists interviewed him on 
many aspects of the referenda but the more interesting parts of the 
proglAamme were when the questions ranged from that topic to the Apple 
and Pear Indus try cant roversy. 
With opinion polls and Liberal surveys indicating that some 
voters in Tasmania were still undecided on the referenda but generally 
there was hope of success, t~r. Fraser was persuaded to make a return 
visit on the eve of the election to swing the last few hesitant voters. 
On this visit though he undid much of his good work of the week before 
and became embroiled in accusations with the local politicians. He 
accused the 'No' campaign of using arguments out of the past and the 
campaigners of bitterness towards him while in reply Senator Rae made 
headlines with his claim that the Government was only seeking to delay 
an election. ~4r. Bingham accused him of poor timing as, in presenting 
the referenda, it "had led to neglect of the crucial fight against 
inf1ation 11 • 36 • 
34. In 1975 the Bass electorate had overv,lhe 1 mi ngly voted against the 
Labor Gow:rnment in the by-election following ~1r. Barnard's resig-
nation from Parliament. 
35. Those Liberal politicians advocating a 'No' vote did not attend 
these dinners. 
36. The Friday, 20 May, 1977. 
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In the two vJeeks of the campaign and sometimes con:urrent vJith 
Mr. Fraser•s visits the 'Yes• Co-ordinating Committee had organised for 
no less than seven Fede1Aa1 politicians and Ministers to come to Tasmania. 
These were Senators Guilfoyle, Withers, Knight, and Hall and t~essrs. 
Ellicott, l'kKellar and Howard. The itinerary for these visits was care-
fully scheduled with the campaigners arriving in time for a talk-back 
radio programrne on one of the commercial stations, a 1 uncheon engagement 
with a selected group or service organisation, an afternoon television 
or press interview and then back to t1elbourne in the late afternoon. 
The most vociferous campaigner of all of these was Senator 
Withers who demanded of the 'No' case the source of their funds. In 
launceston he made a bitter attack on Senator Rae for questionable 
campaign finances and abuse of funds and in reply Senator Rae disclosed 
all the • No' campaign finances. In Tasmania they had received $1400 
in donations from the public, $500 of which had been given by Senator 
Wood of Queensland. Their public exposure hm'lever, was out of all 
proportion to this figure as the media had given their stand wide 
coverage. 
Due to the almost total non-involvement of Mr. Newman and 
Mr. Groom in the campaign Mr. Hodgman was the only Tasmanian Federa 1 
Liberal pol-itician to actively campaign for a •ves' vote and most of his 
pel~sona1 activities were confined to the Denison electorate. In addition 
to writing several articles for Tasmania=s newspapers outlining the 
'Yes' case~ he issued press stateinents and 
debating the issue against Senator Wright at Liberal branch and 
electorate meetings. 
The campaign waged by the Labor Party in the State was a very 
lm'lf-key affair \·rith ~1r. Whitlam and Mr. Hayden making very short visits. 
Mr. t<Jhitlam conducted the only public meeting of the campaign and, to 
a predonrinantly student audience, maintained that the Simultaneous 
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Elections propos a 1 v1as merely making running repairs to the Cons ti tuti on 
and was in no way a move for centralism or extra pov1er to Canberra. 
Other features of his brief visit were several radio and television 
interviews one in v.Jhich he vJas reportedly completely nonplussed by a 
young reporter who blithely asked him: 11 Why should we vote Yes? 11 
Apart from the Premier, t1r. Batt and Senator Wreidt who debated 
on the "~1onday Conference 11 programn-e, the only other Labor members to 
be actively involved in the campa·ign were two of the Party•s Federal 
cand·i dates: Mr. Coates, the candidate for Denison, and Mr. Tate a 
Senate candidate. Mr. Coates advocated a 'Yes' vote in his weekly 
S.E.~ articles 37• while t1r. Tate, an exper-t in constitutional law 
wrote the Labor pamphlet outlining the Party's position on the proposals. 
The principle thrust however of the Labor campaign was to ensure that 
their o1rm suppor~ters were av-1are that the Party wanted them to support 
the 'Yes' case. In so doing they were afraid to push the Party line 
for fear of an anti-Fr·aser vote and a backlash from Liberal voters, 
and in any event \11ere hampered by a lack of enthusiasm amongst 
the rank and file and minimal funds. 
On lOth ~'lay the nation a 1 'No' campaign opened with a ten minute 
television and radio broadcast relayed throughout the country. In the 
programrne many leading figures, including four Liberals and Senator 
Harradine from Tasmania. all cave a bia verbal 'NO' to the Simultaneous 
. . - . . - ~-- - ~ - ~ _. v 
Elections proposal and variously elaborated on their stand. In the 
37. ~n!?j!_Ev_~~j_~_9._l1~xsur-y articles of 26 Febt~uary, 12 and 26 of t~arch, 
9 and 23 of April and 7 and 21 of ~1ay, 1977. 
prelude to this programme it v1as stated that 11 The Referendum on t~ay 21 
is about one simple question. Do we \'lant the politicians in Canberra 
to have still more power?", 38· and this rhetorical que~ition summarised 
the emphasis of the whole programme - that the Federal Government was 
trying to grab more power for itself at the expense of the people and 
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in particular the small States. Senator Rae combined this succinctly 
with the State's rights issue by saying: 11 This proposal is really about 
power. It's a proposal which takes power from the people, pm<Jer from 
the States 11 • 39 • 
The 'No' campaign in Tasmania was opened by the Chairman of 
the 1 N0 1 Committee Sir Magnus Cormack who accused the Simultaneous 
Elections Bill as being fraudulent especially as Mr. Fraser hoc! given 
no explanation nor elaboration of the claim that the Bill was good for 
the country. Furthermore he clained it would 11 erode the status of 
Tasmania in the Federal compact 11 , 40 • and would be particularly damaging 
to the small States \<Jhile, apart from being a blatant grab for power 
it would 11 emasculate the Senate and end in its eventual abolition 11 • 41. 
The Senator's visit was followed soon after by that of Senator vJood 
who added to the attacks on the Federal Government and described 
Mr. Fraser as a centralist and a pov;er hungry Prime Minister who feared 
an election. He had much praise for those politicians in the State 
who had stood up and put Tasmania's interusts first. 
Transcript of Opening Telecast 
Federal Referenda. 
; n C' 1 tnn n V'f+ 
Ill ...JU}J}-'U I v 
39. The _ _!:xaminer_, t~ednesday, 11 t~ay, 1977. 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
of the Case for the 
On the resolution of the air strike Senator Rae was able to 
return to the State and refuted a number of accusations made against 
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him by Federal Liberals, particularly Senator Withers .. He denied being 
responsible fol~ civ"il wal'' within the Party claiming the Governrnent•s 
departure from established policy as the root cause of the dissention. 
Throughout the final days the Senator continually stated that the 
Simultaneous Elections proposal was 11 against the interest of Tasmania1142 • 
and branded the referendum as an unjustified quest for power and the 
Government of bringing the campaign to the gutter. The most public of 
Senator Rae's appearances was the ''Monday Conference 11 debate vJith 
Senator ~·Jrei dt but neither speakers covered any s i gni fi cant new ground 
and a general consensus was that Senator Rae had problably argued the 
• No' case more cogently. 
The other Tasmanian L'iberal Senators, especially Senators Wright 
and ~~alters, campaigned actively in the State particularly amongst 
organisations and Liberal Party branch meetings while speaking occasion-
ally on radio and television. Senator ~~right had also been allowed a 
ten minute right of reply to r~r. Fraser's 11 This Day Tonight 11 programme 
during which he emphasised the threat that the proposals presented to 
Tasmania. In conjunction v1ith this ~1r. Bingham conducted the PLP's 
campaign almost on his ovm and, through Party meetings, television 
i ntervievvs and press statements he constantly attacked the State Labor 
Go ve rnrnent. 
Both the Liberal and Labor Parties and the 'No' Committee issued 
sorr.e campaign material and the Liberal's Federal Director of Public 
Relations, 1"1r. Gaudino had made available to the Labor Party the 
--------..,-----
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liberal's pamphlets and 11 How to Vote Cards 11 • These were not widely 
distributed by the Liberals in the State while T-shirts, badges and 
other paraphenali a also came from Canberra. The Labor Party however, 
only reluctantly accepted the Liberal offer as it was consicl.:red by 
them to be against the best interests of.their supporters. Instead 
they had printed one pamphlet and distributed Mr. Tate's article which 
he had written for the Tasmanian University newspaper Togatl!.!:i_· This 
was also reprinted in the Labor Party's o~tm ne\'lsletter and was reported 
to have been letterboxed to some 30,000 homes in the Hobart area. 
In contrast to the 'Yes' case the 'No' case only printed one 
s man 11 1-low to Vote Card 11 although Senator ~Jri ght had one of his own 
showing 'No • to both the Simultaneous Elections and Senate Cas ua 1 
Vacancies proposals. These again were not widely distributed in the 
State. 
Advertisements on television and in the press appeared from 
both sides but for the most part vJere small and rare. Those press 
advertisements of note were the large advertisement from the N.S.W. 
Constitutional League and the telegram Sir Robert l~enzies had sent to 
Senator Wright in support of the 'No' case, while one for the 'Yes' case 
had been submitted amid much publicity by the personal donations of 
several Labor politicians. 
On polling day booths were manned sporadically by supporters 
of both cases and from both parties but the coverage \'las in no way 
comprehensive. In Hobart the Labor Party claimed to have manned most 
booths in the Denison electorate at son-e stage, while in Launa:ston 
they were repor·ted to have covered alniost half the city. The Liberal 
turnout for the booths in support of either cases was even less. The 
Labor Party also provided a transport service for their voters on the 
day. 
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Thus the campai Jn showed up the emotionalism and propaganda 
generated by the politicians and the lack of real support and enthusiasm 
amongst the rank and file in the Parties in the State. While the 
campaign was brought before the people by the media and had actively 
engaged a fevJ politicians and the Federal Government, the majority of 
Tasmanians were uninvolved. 
The Liberal Party in the State was in disarray and in no body, 
Par1 i anEntary or Organisation a 1 v1as a united front adopted. Individuals 
went their ovm vJay and the end result was a strange collection of bed-
fellml/s. On the one hand was the Federal Government, the State Labor 
Party, and a fevt Federal t~HR's, a Senator and State Liberal t~P, while 
on the other were the State Liberal Parliamentary Party, the Liberal 
Senators, t·1r. Wing and Senator Harradi ne. In between were a 11 those 
who \'Jere either undecided or neutral. 
Yet, despite this confusing array, the Tasmanian response to 
the Simultaneous Election referendum was a clear and unequivocal 'No•. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
THE RESULTS FLUENCES UPON THE TASMANIAN 
At the close of polling on Saturday, 21 May early returns in 
Tac;mani a indicated that the Simultaneous Elections referendum was 
unlikely to be passed. This trend was accentuated as returns from 
country areas came in and the final result was beyond even the highest 
expectations of the 'No' campaigners. At the declaration of the poll 
Tasmania had delivered an overwhelming 'No' vote of 65.8% to the 
Simultaneous Elections referendum. 
However, vthile Tasmania and Queensland had clearly indicated 
their rejection of the proposal the early returns in Western Australia 
had registered support. It vvas not until late in the evening that the 
trend began to reverse itself in that State and the 'No' campaigners 
saw victory. The final result in !>!estern Australia was a 48.4% vote 
in favour of the proposal and in Queensland a slightly less 47.5%. 
As can be seen from Table 1. in the other States the proposal 
passed with a clear majority and the results shm'l the lack of any 
substantial controvery raised by the issue there. New South Wales 
returned the highest vote in favour of the proposals, 70.7%, and 
between this figure and the Tasmanian vote was a margin of 36.5%. 
It is this margin which has real s.alience for the referendum as it 
indicates the divergence of opinion throughout the nation. The 
Simultaneous Elections proposal only became an issue in the small 
States which believed the proposal to be a threat to them. Hence it 
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TABLE 1. 
NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE FOUR REFERENDA: 21 ~~y 1977 
(by State, percentage of formal votes) 
I REFERENDUM I Tas. I W.A. I S.A. I Qld. I vk._f __ NSWl Aust. 
Simultaneous 
I E1ecti ons 
Senate Casual 
Vacancies 
34.2 
53.7 
48.4 65.9 I 47.5 
57. 1 76.5 58.9 
64.9 70.7 62.2 
76.1 81.6 1 73.3 
I 
Referendums I 62.2 I 72.6 I 83.2 ! 59.6 I 80.7 83.9 I 77.7 
RetiringAgefor 724 I 783 8551 652 I 814 848 I 80.1 ·1 
Federal Judges • 1 • • • l · · I 1 
I I _j 
Source: Data provided by the Australian Electoral Office 
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was only defeated in there. In Tasmania which returned a 'No' vote 
of 66%1. the results may be looked at from a number of perspectives and 
the politicians' viewpoint was the one which was most often presented 
to the public. 
The resounding 'No' vote was believed by the leading 'No' 
advocates to be because the State saw the proposal as a threat to the 
power and influence of the Senate and thereby itself. Senator Wright 
said that the rejection 11 Showed the value that the smaller States placed 
on the Senate .. 2• and that the small States 11 di d not regard the Senate as 
completely a party House 11 , 3· while Senator Harradi ne said the vote 
justified the conclusion 11 th at smaller States regarded the Senate as 
the protector of their ri ghts 11 • 4• Senator Walters and fvlr. Bingham also 
expressed views similar to those above while Senator Rae considered the 
vote w::s one of confidence in the Senate and "a re-affirmation of its 
role as a State•s House 11 • 5• 
In addition to these statements the vote was seen by Senator~ 
Rae and Harradine as an indication that Tasmanians clearly wanted an 
independent Senate and "parliamentary representatives- particularly in 
the Senate - v1ho would speak up for Tasrnani a". 6• Senator Rae vvent even 
1. The figure represents the closest whole number to the actual figure 
of 65.8% 
2. The t~erc~_, fvlonday, 23 May, 1977. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. The A us tra 1 ian, Thursday, 26 r,1ay, 1977. 
6. Ib£_ ~1erc~, t1onday, 23 l~ay, 1977. 
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fm~ther and saw in the result~ a victory for the Senate and a green 
light for it 11 to further develop its separate entity" 7• while the rift 
betltJeen the bw Houses over the referendum was nothing more than the 
development of vigor and separateness between them. Sr~nator Ha rradi ne 
hoped that Senators in future would 11 assert their independence and act 
in the interests of the people rather than pursue blindly the dictates 
of party po1itics 11 • 8• 
On several occasions Senator Rae maintained that the vote was 
a stand against centralism and the growth of central power just as the 
'No' campaign had branded the Bill as a grab for POI!Jer. Hence the 
victory was then for federalism and democracy as 11 the electors in the 
three smallest States have clearly indicated they are not prepared to 
give unlimited paner to Canberra". 9• 
In explaining the referendum result Mr. Hodgman and the Labor 
proponents consi det~ed the corollary of the above argument. Rather than 
seeing the vote as one in favour of the Senate they considered that the 
issue of state 1 s r·ights had determined the vote. The 'No 1 campaign had 
convinced Tasmanians that the Simultaneous Elections proposal was a 
threat to their povJer_, and in grity and position in the Commom1ealth 
and, once this fear was engendered its influence v1as so pervasive as to 
be almost uncounterable. 
7. Jlle A us t ra "li an, Thursday, 26 May, 19 77. 
9. The Advocate, Monday, 23 May, 1977. 
The 11 Editorial 11 in The Advocate also followed this theme and 
considered 11 Tasmanians ••• have again made it plain to Canberra that 
they will fight tooth ant nail to preserve the Senate's function as a 
charnpi on of the rights of the srna 11 States in the nation a 1 forum 11 • 10 · 
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The belief that the negative stance of Tasmania on a referendum 
is determined by a state's rights vote has been longstanding and 
Livingston was clearly of a similar opinion when he considered the 
referendum in Tasmania. Furthermore this argument provided a convenient 
peg from which the 'Yes' proponents could rationalise their defeat and 
protect their own integrity. 
As mentioned in Chapter I Sharman has shovm that Tasmanian 
have a distinctive relationship with the Senate. The Simultaneous 
Elections Bill was portrayed as being a threat to this House and hence 
the results can be seen as a further indication of this phenomenon. 
From Table 2 Tasmania has shown a consistently low vote for all Senate 
referenda and this vote has been significantly lower than that recorded 
in other States. Although the Senate Casual Vacancies Bill was also 
concerned with the Senate it v1as not perceived as presenting any great 
threat to the Senate and, like the Senate Elections of 1906, was passed 
success fully. 
In comparison vti th the 1974 figures, see Figure 1., the 1977 
Simultaneous Elections result indicates unequi vocab ly that Tasmanians 
are averse to this referendum regardless of whichever federal party 
proposes it. In 1974 the proposal vias presented by the Labor Party and, 
10. IJ~Advo~, Monday, 23 May, 1977. 
. 
L.') 
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TABLE 2. 
NATIONAL SUPPORT FOR SENATE REFEREND\: 196 7 ~ 
1974 and 1977 (by State, percentage of formal votes) 
Tas. W.A. S.A. Qld. Vi c. NSW 
1967- Relative size of 
Senate and House 23.06 29.05 33.91 44.13 30.87 !51.03 
of Representatives. 
1974 - Simultaneous 41.37 44.07 47.14 44.32 49.19 !) 1. 06 Elections 
1977 - Simultaneous 34.27 48.47 65.99 47.51 65.00 70.71 Elections 
1977 - Filling Casual 53.79 57.11 76.59 58.86 76.13 81.62 Vacancies 
Sources: 1967 and 1974 data from Australian Parliamentary Handbook; 1977 data provided by 
the Australian Electoral Office. 
Aust. 
40.25 
48.30 
62.22 
73.32 
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Support for rhe. Sirv'\vHo.neous E\ectiOV'\.S 
Reft?.reiio\u 1 'H4 O.V\o\ I t.)17 
~ 0~ ~ ~ ~"'Jo ~0 ~"--"' ~o 
<o~~ K::)l(/ «.q~ ~ ~ 
.rr----, Sovrce.:: DeAle\ provjo\(>_o{ by Wle Avsrv-o.lio.\1\ 
Etedorc-.1 Offitt 
while vot·ing in the general election held at the same time, Tasmania 
returned a Labor Government and a Liberal Senate but soundly rejected 
87. 
the Bill. In 1977 it was presented by a federal Liberal Government and 
supported by the State Labor Government but again defE!ated. This there-
fer disproves any at temp·: to see the referendum result as indicative of 
a strict Labor or Liberal vote. However, this party vote in 1977 
warrants closer scrutiny. 
One journalist maintained 11 • that the Simultaneous Elections 
result parallelled the Labor and Liberal vote returned for the Senate 
in the elections of 1975. In doing so he combined the Liberal vote of 
49% with that of Senator Harradine as the latter had advocated a 1 No• 
vote to the proposal. The Senator had received 13% of the vote and 
hence, if Tasmanians voted on a Liberal-Harradine line this would account 
for 62% of the vote - not far removed from the 66% returned for the 
referendum. However, the essential •allacy of this claim is revealed 
when the Labor-Liberal votes are examined in more detail. 
If a number of subdivisions which are renowned for returning a 
strong Labor or Liberal vote are examined, it is obvious that many Labor 
voters voted against the official Labor Party line. For example in 
Denison, Ne 1 son (Libera 1) and Merton (Labor) both returned a 62% 12 • • No • 
vote to Simultaneous Elections question while in Braddon, Murchison 
(Labor) returned an even higher 1 No' vote- 65%, than did the Liberal 
stronghold of Circular Head - 63%. Clearly then this referendum was not 
considered a party issue and Tasmanians did not vote along party lines. 
This is a most unusual feature for a refe·rencium. 
11. Mr. Adrian Wild in The Sun 
1977. 
Examiner E ress of Saturday, 28 May, 
12. All data supplied by the Australian Electoral Office. 
During the campaign the State Labor Party was relatively 
uninvolved and both they and their Liberal companions did not push the 
party line in their advo::acy of a 'Yes' vote. The reason for this ~tJas 
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that they feared alienating each others traditional supporters and hence 
incurring an elector-al backlash. Hence the 'No' vote in Tasmania could 
be regarded as one of support for the Federal Liberal Senators who had 
taken a stand which was projected as being in the best interests of the 
State. 
Conversely, the results could also be seen as an anti-Fraser 
vote by members of both parties. The Liberals because he is unpopular 
in Tasmania, and by_ Labor voters because they di.d not want to appear 
to be supporting him. This latter reason could wen have been 
accentuated by the lack of definite direction taken by the State Labor 
Party. Labor members often appeared to be more intent on di scredi ti ng 
the State Liberals than convinc-ing their supporters to vote 'Yes •. 
Although an anti-Fraser vote was denounced by all 'No' 
proponents, especially Senator Rae who declared it as 11 utter rubbi sh 11 , 
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the unpopularity of Mr. Fraser in Tasmania and the divisions witnn the 
State Liberal Party, could well have been negative influences on Liberal 
voters. In addition to this the influx of 11 heavies 11 for the 'Yes' 
campaign caul d have been counter-productive in a State known for its 
loyalties to its politicians and suspicions of so much attention. Again 
Liberal voters could have been wary of the federal Liberal line because it 
was also espoused by ~~r. ~1hitlam. The latter had made a disastrous 
mistake in Queensland of saying publicly that the proposal \'JOuld most 
benefit the Labor Party. Other factors also operating against the 
Liberal vote were the unexplained volte-face and the refusal of ~lr. Fraser 
to adequately ansvJer the 'No' case•s criticisms. 
In combination with these negative influences was the positivr.: 
weight of the personalities of the 'No' campaigners. The lm<~ vote to 
all the proposals in Bass vJas assumed by most political commentators 
and newspapers to be due to the strong personal following of Senator Rae. 
In a State where politics is personalised and personalities play a 
significant role this claim has much validity. In contrast to this the 
State Liberal 'Yes• campaigners were relative newcomers to the political 
arena and were not considered to have strong followings. In addition 
the federal 1 Yes' campaigners were all non-Tasmanians and while the 
State Government also supported the proposal, the issue was seen by most 
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Tasmanians as primarily one which concerned the Federa 1 Government. 
The ramifications of the Senate, State•s rights and Party vote 
on the Simultaneous Elections proposal are the major features which 
err.erge from the Tasmanian results. Other factors which could also have 
been influential are: the aftermath of the Apple and Pear Industry 
controversy; the ai rstri ke which i so 1 a ted and inconvenienced many 
Tasmanians; the propensity for Tasmanians to have a sharp sense of 
political reality particularly in relation to Upper Houses - visualise 
Tasmania's vote for the Legislative Council; and the influence exerted 
on Tasmanians by the Legislative Council elections the following 
Saturday. On that occasion the Labor Party had campaigned strongly for 
their candidates but all had been soundly defeated. In combination \'lith 
this caul d have been the effects of the propaganda, a vote fer a 
constitutional principle as well as those factors which invariably accom-
pany a referendum- ignorance and apathy. 
Thus, like in all referenda, no over-riding reason appears to 
exp1 ai n Tasmania • s result to the Simultaneous Elections referendum. On 
the one hand the argument that Tasmania voted for the Senate has great 
credence but cognizance must also be taken of the State's rights issue. 
In combination \'lith this were other factors and inherent and procedural 
difficulties which may have been influential. However, while these 
factors determined the Simultaneous Elections result at the same time they 
did not influence Tasmanians' perception of the other three proposals. 
The Senate Casual Vacancies referendum received a 53.7% 'Yes• 
vote but from Figure 2. the propos a 1 fa'il ed to be supported in the 
electorates of Bass and Wilmot. The Referendums proposal was passed with 
a 62.2% majority and the margin between the Franklin and Denison 
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electorates on this pr·oposal "'·as a very high 15.6%. Denison's vote 
on this referendum as for the other proposals perhaps reflects a more 
discerning and intelligent electorate and the focus of the 'Yes' campaign. 
The Retiring Age for Federal Judges proposal was passed by a State 
majority of 72.4% - the highest vote Tasmania has recorded for a refer-
endum since 1910. 
In the other States (see Table 1.) these proposals also passed 
without any serious threat though Tasmania, Western Australia and 
Queensland all registered votes lower than those recorded in the large 
States. Despite an overall national majority of 62.2% the referendum 
failed to pass because it failed to be accepted in a majority of States. 
While a complex pattern of influences prevailed over the 
Tasmanian vote to the Simultaneous Elections referendum, in the Liberal 
Party in the State the issue has had very little long term affect. 
At the titre of the teferendum campaign the 'Yes' and 'No' 
proponents had strongly opposed each other5 but, in the State party at 
least, there is very little evidence to show that this has been carried 
over to any great extent in subsequent Party affairs. As Hr. Adrian 
Wild in the Sund,Ey Examiner Ex~ss remarked a week after polling day, 
11With the result now clear, the degree of Tasmanian Liberal unity appears 
unchanged. That is not to say there is no division 11 • 13· 
This is perhaps the most succint summary of the Liberal Party 
position for division did exist prior to the campaign. But, Vv'hile these 
flared up during the controversy they do not appear to have unduly 
13. The Sunda,y Ex ami n~r E_xpress, Monday, 28 May, 1977. 
9 3. 
exacerbated, nor s i gni fi cantly altered, the previous situation. As those 
Liberal politicians interviewed constantly reiterated, in the Party "issues 
once settled die 11 • 
From the eve of polling day the State Liberals began to close 
ranks. ~ir. Hodgman declared 11 We have never had a party split 1114 • and 
"any disunity in the Liberal Party ended at eight o'clock sharp on Satur-
day ni ght 11 • 15 • His 'No' Party colleagues were a 1 i ttle more reticent on 
the issue and Senator vJr·ight was reported as saying "The campaign, from 
the point of view of Liberal Party unity is obviously regrettable 11 , 16 
whileMr. Bingham referred to it as "troublesome". 17· Senator Rae said 
"the public disagreement over the issue within the ranks of the Liberal 
Party would not affect the unity of the party in the long term- partic-
ularly in Tasmania 1118• while in another article it was reported that 
11 th ere has been no i ndi cation in the past few days of continuing 
ani mas iti'. 19 • 
Despite one report that the State PLP was 11 deeply divided1120 • 
there has been little other evidence to show that the referendum has had 
any lasting effect upon them. The defection of party ranks by Mr. Baker 
was a serious act of defiance at the time but does not appear, publicly 
at least, to have had any wider ramifications. Possibly it showed some 
14. The f~er:-cury, ~1onday, 23 ~1ay, 1977. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Tl_ ..! _I 101 a. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Th~~, t,ion dax, 2 3 r~ay, 19 77. 
19. The Sunday Examiner Express, t1onday, 28 t1ay, 1977. 
20. Th~ MercurY-, Monday, 23 May, 1977. 
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disaffection with ~1r. Bingham's leadership but even Mr. Bingham acknow-
ledged privately that he should have taken a stronger stand on an earlier 
occasion and hence prevented the Labor Party exploiting the issue. Despite 
th~s, l~r. Bingham's claimsthat the Party has been strengthened by the 
controversy seem rather dubious assertions. 
In an attempt to regain some of their lost respect the PLP 
tried to attack the Labor Government and show how the decision vJas a rebuff 
for Mr. Neilson and the Labor proponents. However, this was shortlived, 
was not overly effective and was soon overshadowed by other events. 
The only occasion on which the Simultaneous Elections issue has 
been resurrected was at the State Council's Meeting of the Party when 
Mr. Wing's position as Party President was challenged. One of the reasons 
mentioned at this time was his public announcements in opposition to the 
Bill but sources regarded this as only a convenient peg from which to 
mount some opposition to his Presidency. With four years in office a 
challenge was not unexpected especially as some of the more conservative 
ment)ers of the Party believed that a federal leader should be supported 
regardless of any opinions to the contrary. 
To the Party the controversy is now regarded as embarrassing. 
The issue revealed the division within the Liberal ranks across all levels 
and had left the PLP in the unenviable position of both having to change 
their minds and to be at odds with their- own organisation and federal 
leaders. Furthermore the issue was used by the Labor Party to ridicule 
them in public. 
t~hile the controversy has left the Liberal Party in Tasmania 
embarrassed but subtantially unchanged it is more difficult to guage the 
position of and re 1 ati onshi p bebteen Federal MHR' s, Senators and Canberra. 
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The campaign waged by some of the ·leading protagonists from both sides 
seemed to contain more than an element of surface bitterness. In 
addition to the constitutional and federal stands taken on the issue the 
evidence from nevJspaper reports and interviews does appear th~t for some 
protagonists at least, the campaign was an extension of personal 
animosities. 
The euphoria shovm by Senator Rae to the • No • victory may be 
viewed in this light. The Senator saw the issue as the most significant 
of his whole parliamentary career and hence his description of the 
victory as, 11 as important as the Eureka Stockade 112 1. is not out of 
context. He also attacked his State 'Yes' opponents when he said of 
them: "This group had inflated ideas of the extent to which it rejected 
the views of the rank and file liberal support in Tasmania". 22 • These 
people 10w have "reason to reconsider what Tasmania expects of them11 • 23• 
The defeat of the proposal he believed had seriously discredited 
Mr. Hodgman in the party and left Mr. Newman in an even more awkward 
position. In a State Party dominated by those who show disaffection 
for r~r. Fraser this may we 11 be the case. 
In contrast to this, Mr. Hodgman privately considered that the 
1 N0 1 victory could be attributed more to the influence and prestige of 
Senator i•lright, than that of Senator Rae. The latter•s influence he 
considered negligible. Mr. Hodgman also related the fact that i~r. Fraser 
had personally thanked him for this •ves' campaign in Tasmania and had 
21. The Examiner, Monday, 23 May, 1977. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Ibid. 
done so publicly in Cabinet. In addition the Prime Minister had asked 
many of his Ministers to express their personal gratitude to him. 
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In a barely disguised attack on Mr. Fraser Mr. Bingham accused 
the Federal Government of neglecting the country. He said 11 At the time 
when they should have been concentrating on that (the economy) ..• they 
have been skipping round the country exhorting people to vote 'Yes •. u 24· 
Several other politicians interviewed considered that the Simultaneous 
Elections defeat was a serious setback for t·1r. Fraser both at the State 
and Federal levels. Further it indicated the real extent of his 
unpopularity in Tasmania and, as one political commentator remarked, 
"Prime Minister Fraser was treated like the head of an opposition party 
when he visited Tasmania during the referendums campaign" 25 · 
The personal animosities in the Liberal Party are of long 
standing and apart from perhaps re-inforcing them and consolidating 
Senator Rae•s position in Canberra, it is difficult to really assess any 
other affect. In view however, of the seriousness with which the 
campaign was fought it is surprising that there has not been a greater 
aftermath to the issue. In public at least the issue appears to have 
died and the Liberai Party has emerged remarkably unscathed. 
ASSESSMENT OF WILDAVSKY'S HYPOTHESES 
While the controversy has left the Liberal Party relatively 
unaltered in the long term. at the time of the campaign the tenents of 
Wildavsky's hypothesis were evident and the referendum did exacerbate 
stresses and strains in the sponsoring party. On this occasion it 
24. The t4ercy_ry, Monday, 23 ~1ay, 1977. 
25. The Sunday Examiner .E~ress, Saturday, 28 May, 1977. 
occurred betv;een the Federal liberal Government and some Liberal 
Senators and its repercussions extended through all levels of the Party 
and polarised it into opposing camps. In Wildavsky's examination of 
the 1926 referendum there is nothing to show that he considered any 
time span in relation to his hypothesis. Thus, from the evidence 
supplied by the Liberal Party in the 1977 Simultaneous Elections his 
theory must be qualified. The stresses and strains exacerbated by a 
referendum are evident only for the duration of the campaign and are 
not usually carried over into other affairs of the Party. 
The campaign provides a telling comment on the interal affairs 
of the Liberal Party and the extent of personal emnity. Wildavsky 
hypothesised that the spectacular conflicts which developed within the 
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Party over a referendum are generally determined by pre-existing tensions. 
From t"'e evidence supplied, personal disaffection for the Prime Minister 
and some of his colleagues was one of the motivating factors that 
prompted the dissident Senators to mount such an intense and emotional 
campaign. It is not unreasonable to consider then that the positions 
adopted by the various protagonists as a mere extension of these personal 
animosities. 
Wildavsky's second hypothesis was that the nature of a refer-
endum involves a transfer of power and this alone promotes conflict. 
Again from the positions adopted by the State Premiers of l~estern 
Australia and Queensland it \'las evident that they saw in the referendum 
a dimunition of their powers. In Tasmania 
Harradine, adopted a sim·ilar attitude. In contrast to this were the 
unusual alliances between Labor merrters and Liberals in support of the 
• Yes • case. 
98. 
The federal natu1·e of political parties V·Jas also considered by 
Wildavsky to be highlighted by a referendum. In 1977 this was certainly 
so in the Liberal Par-ty where in general Senators and MHR 1 s provide a 
bridge bebveen the State and fecleral bodies. The refe.,.endum controversy 
however, showed the precariousness of this relationship. While 
Tasmanian MHR 1 s in the main followed the federal line, the Senators 
adopted a position in defence of the interests of the State and were 
supported by the State Parlian~ntary Party. The Organisation, caught 
between opposing sides took a neutral stance. However, the strength of 
the Tasmanian Party is indicated by their vehement and successful 
opposition to their federal colleagues and it would be expected that in 
future more cognizance will be given to their opinions. 
Wildavsky's hypotheses apply then with some qualifications to 
the 1977 Simultaneous Elections referendum. But, the essential limit-
ations of his theories are revealed when due recognition is given to 
fact that at the same time they did not apply to, nor seriously affect, 
the other three referenda proposa]s. His theories, while exp 1 ai ning 
" '''':U ,.· 
the 1977 Simultaneous Elections proposal, are only applicable to those 
situations where the party sponsoring a referendum beco~s seriously 
divided. On other occasions it is an unsatisfactory ~ans of inter-
preting referenda defeat. 
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CONCLUSION 
The 1977 Simultaneous Elections r~ferendum simply added to the 
number of other futile attempts to amend the Cons ti tuti on of A us tra 1 i a. 
In contrast to this defeat however, the three other referenda presented 
at the same time were carried thus supporting tre hypothesis that 
referenda have more chance of success when they are not overly contro-
versial and have the support of major political parties. 
The Simultaneous Elections referendum contained a number of 
those characteristics typical of other failed proposals. Firstly the 
proposal involved a redistribution of State and Federal powers ·Jn the 
direction of the Federal Government, and the small States and some 
Senators saw this as a threat to their position and influence. 
Characteristic of a referenuum campaign, minimal public discussion 
occurred of the constitutional and federal issues raised by the proposal. 
While in 1977 some newspapers did attempt to present the for and against 
cases, the emphasis in the nEdia was on the personalities involved and 
the propaganda of the campaign. The accusations both sides made ranged 
widely from the subject and for the most part were not answered by the 
'Yes• case and capitalised upon by the 'No• campaigners. 
While both Federal Parties supported the proposals such agree-
ment was unusual in a country essentially strongly divided on party 
lines and had a counter productive effect of arousing suspicion amongst 
the electorate. This was particularly acute in those small States at 
the geographical extremes of the federation where such a feeling often 
prevails. Furthermore this sus pi cion was accentuated by the i nconsi s t-
ency of the Federal Liberal Party in presenting a proposal which they 
had so strongly opposed on a 11 prev·i ous occasions. 
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In addition to this the Liberal Party could not adopt a united 
approach and, ~>Jhi le government was not at stake, the State organs of the 
Party and some Federal memers adopted a stand contrary to the official 
line. Hm•mver at the sarre tine these factors did not apply to the 
other three referenda which were overwhelmingly passed by the nation. 
Thus, while at the same tine the Simultaneous Elections 
referendum was defeated and the other three successful, it has disproved 
the notion that the electorate votes indiscriminately on referendum 
issues. Clearly in Western Australia, Queensland and Tasmania this was 
not the case. Similarly this referendum has further disproved those 
theories v1hich suggested that people follow a party vote on referenda. 
The influence exerted by inherent and procedural factors 
associated with a referendum are difficult to gauge in relation to the 
Simultaneous Elections issue, but certainly it has been proved again 
Sou.Y'ce: '11~e Aust~qJianJ Tuesday, 24 May, 1.9?7. 
that it is extremely difficult to achieve any signifi~.~ant change to the 
Australian Constitution. What does stand out however is that in the 
nature of each referendum different and sorretimes oppo~;ing factors may 
operate on any one occasion. 
Although Wildavsky's hypotheses have been qualified by this 
study, for the most part they have proved a valid rreans of analysing 
the Simultaneous Elections referendum. However, like the 1926 Comrrerce 
and Industry proposal for the most part his theories have been srown to 
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be limited to particular situations which may apply to any one referenda. 
In Tasmania in 1977 those factors which determined the State•s 
vote on the Simultaneous Elections referendum were not applicable to 
the other three proposals. Tasmanians voted for either or both the 
Senate and the preservation of the State•s traditional rights and 
responsibilities, and or for the stand taken by the Liberal Senators. 
Yet, while it was also considered that the vote may have been an anti-
Fraser vote, against more power to Canberra or because the 'Yes• case 
was presented by non-Tasmanians intent on discrediting the local 
politicians, these factors did not apply to tre Senate Casual Vacancies, 
Referendums and Retiring Age for Federal Judges proposals. 
The referendum showed up some of the internal divisions in the 
State Liberal Party but these were short-lived and have not re-appeared 
since. It also revealed the apathy of the Labor Party and the extent 
to which a campaign can be waged in a State as small as Tasmania. 
Thus a referendum in Tasmania has been analysed and described 
and while from pr-evious r-eferenda Tasmanians had been assumed to take a 
negative and indiscriminate approach to all proposals, the 1977 
Simultaneous Elections results belied that contention. Tasmanians 
showed that they could di scri mi nate betvJeen referenda, •we re not averse 
to voting 'Yes• when they saw reason to and at the same time to give 
a resounding 'No 1 to any proposal which they saH as a threat to their 
position and i nte gri ty in the Commonwe a 1 th. 
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